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Considering Security in Florida’s  
Transportation Project Development Process 
Phillip W. Stevens, P.E., AICP 
 ABSTRACT 
 The transportation decision-making process takes on different forms in 
different states.  The purpose of this study was to include and move 
considerations for national, state, and local security needs into the transportation 
project development arenas with a focus on Florida.  A thorough and updated 
literature review was completed to determine the current state of the industry 
regarding incorporating security considerations into the transportation planning 
process.  A review of current Federal, State, and Local laws and regulations 
concerning planning requirements was conducted to outline planning parameters 
and limitations.  An information request letter was mailed to the key planning staff 
members for all 50 states in the United States, the District of Columbia and 
Puerto Rico and other key stakeholders.  An online survey was conducted to 
determine public opinion about transportation security.  As a result of these 
efforts, a modified PD&E process was developed, key findings were identified, 
future research needs were defined, and an outline of next steps was developed. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction And Approach 
1.1 Problem Statement 
 Federal Code defines terrorism as “Terrorism includes the unlawful use of 
force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a 
government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of 
political or social objectives.” (Code of Federal Regulations, Title 28, Volume 1, 
Section 0.85, July 1, 2004).  United States Code defines security as “Protection 
from terrorist threats or actions due to acts of extreme violence resulting in 
significant loss of life, injury, and/or damage or destruction of facilities and 
infrastructure, whether or not these acts are intended to further political or social 
objectives.” (United States Code, Title 18, Part 1, Chapter 113B, Section 
2331(5), January 7, 2003).   
 The transportation decision-making process takes on different forms in 
different states.  There are clear federal guidelines that motivate and facilitate 
these processes.  However, these guidelines lack provisions for security 
considerations in the transportation planning and decision-making processes.  As 
with other issues, such as landscaping and Intelligent Transportation Systems 
2 
 
(ITS), that have historically migrated through the project cycle backwards, there 
is a high potential for security considerations to take the same path.  This path 
would involve beginning in a retrofit, operations, and/or maintenance phase and 
proceeding backwards through asset acquisition, design, programming, and 
finally residing in the planning process. 
1.2 Purpose And Objectives 
 The purpose of this study was to include and move considerations for 
national, state, and local security needs into the transportation planning arena, 
specifically into Florida’s Project Development Process.  They currently exist in 
the operational phases of projects but are not involved in early project phases.   
This study accomplished this through the development of a set of guidelines for 
planners and decision-makers to use when developing and screening reasonable 
and feasible projects and alternatives and when implementing their planning and 
work programs. 
1.3 Value Of Research 
 Specific benefits of these guidelines include: 
? Established a methodology for comparing alternatives regarding 
transportation security. 
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? Can justify management decisions for altering programming, budgeting, and 
staffing assignments that may differ from previous norms. 
? Encouraged identification of technical and research needs in transportation 
security planning. 
? Increased efficiency and effectiveness of transportation decision-making by 
educating decision-makers on potential fatal flaws. 
? Allowed for the information to be used in other similar situations, such as 
natural disasters. 
1.4 Significance 
 This study can be used to provide specific recommendations for inclusion 
of security considerations into the transportation planning process that would 
have an immediate utility at various levels (i.e., federal, state, local) throughout 
Florida.  This study can facilitate planning efforts between these levels and result 
in an additional screening tool that can be used to evaluate potential 
transportation projects and more accurately assess the benefits and costs of 
those alternatives.  This study can also be used as instructional material for 
training those decision-makers on security sensitivity in the planning and project 
development phases.    
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1.5 Scope Of Study 
1.5.1 Content Limitations 
 The content of this study was limited to that material that could be 
researched, documented, printed, reproduced, presented in any form, and 
discussed without violating any federal, state, or local laws, including those 
policies and procedures relating to issues of security. 
1.5.2 Spatial Limitations 
 This study examined the transportation project development process as it 
exists in the State of Florida.  Even though some discussion concerning the 
methodologies and status of decision-making initiatives of other states occurred, 
this study focused on Florida. 
1.5.3 Temporal Limitations 
 The topic of this study is rapidly developing.  The most current and 
available information was used during the life of this study.  However, due to the 
significance of this topic in the project development process, and the current 
cultural sensitivities that may exist regarding the topic of security, this topic will 
continue to develop for several years.   
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1.5.4 Contextual Limitations 
 The application of the guidelines established during this study will primarily 
apply to the current transportation project development process in Florida.  It can 
be expected that certain elements of the guidelines will be universally applicable 
but other elements will only apply to the conditions within Florida.  In addition, the 
research was limited to those issues that are not currently developed within the 
industry.   
1.6 Consumers Of Research 
 This effort will prove beneficial to a large number of consumers (Table 
1-1).   
Table 1-1 
Research Beneficiaries 
1. Federal, state, and local policy makers 
2. Key project staff involved in Project Development & 
Environment (PD&E) studies or other similar National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) studies 
3. Staff involved in work program development and 
maintenance 
4. Designated safety staff at all levels 
5. Designated security staff at all levels 
6. Transportation planners 
7. Transportation consultants 
8. Transportation system managers 
9. Elected officials and appointees 
10. Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPO’s) and their staff 
6 
 
 
1.7 Methodology 
 The development of transportation planning strategies that include 
enhanced security considerations requires tremendous commitment to 
developing models for implementation over the long term.  Specifically, there is 
considerable evidence to suggest that many transportation planning processes 
are weak and are ill-prepared to manage the needs of today’s users without 
extensive modifications to processes and procedures.  Unfortunately, with the 
continuous threats of violence, terrorism and other criminal behaviors in the 
United States, transportation systems have become increasingly vulnerable to 
these challenges.  As a result, effective strategies must be developed that will 
accommodate the needs of users around the country.  For the purposes of this 
chapter, Florida transportation planning systems will serve as the primary focus 
of this research study, with an emphasis placed upon the ability to develop 
effective security methods and processes that will lead to safer routes.  The 
methodology for the proposed research study will employ a qualitative method of 
research, as this will require extensive attention to the quality of the processes 
currently in place, which will lead to new conclusions regarding the development 
of new and enhanced programs that will promote security at an even greater 
level. 
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 Any research study involving transportation planning processes requires 
that there must be a thorough and comprehensive evaluation of existing 
strategies in order to identify areas that require improvements, as well as the 
direction in which these processes should lead in the future.  There is 
considerable evidence throughout transportation planning to suggest that the 
quality of these strategies and their cohesiveness with existing transportation 
channels is a key indicator of their likelihood of success or failure.  For example, 
if a program exists that does not provide effective measures for promoting and 
enhancing security, then it is very likely that transportation security planning is 
doomed for failure in one way or another.  Therefore, strategic measures must be 
taken that will enable transportation planners to develop processes that are 
designed to fill the voids of current processes, emphasizing security-enhancing 
measures that are seriously lacking in many modern systems.   
 The level of security that is provided by a transportation system is perhaps 
the key measurement that transportation planners must consider in today's world.  
Since there are many threats to the livelihood and integrity of transportation 
systems, there is an important lesson to be learned with regards to the 
development of security measures that will offer passengers the best possible 
sense of comfort and ease in their travels.  Regardless of the location across the 
United States, transportation planning has become a tricky and complex 
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phenomenon, whereby there are considerable challenges for planners in the 
areas of strategic development and security administration.  Despite government 
and local influence, there are a number of challenges with respect to modifying 
systems to accommodate changing needs, and therefore, it is critical that the 
appropriate methods are utilized in order to accomplish the desired tasks.  The 
proposed research study will define the overall effectiveness of a multi-
dimensional transportation planning system in promoting a greater understanding 
of the needs of communities and leaders, as well as to address major security 
issues and complications that might ensue during planning and implementation. 
 The following efforts were completed to determine the current 
transportation planning practice, possible arenas to incorporate security 
considerations, possible methodologies to incorporate security considerations, 
and effectiveness of those methodologies to properly consider security in the 
planning process: 
? A thorough and updated literature review to determine the current state of the 
industry regarding incorporating security considerations into the transportation 
planning process. 
? A review of current Federal, State, and Local laws and regulations concerning 
planning requirements was conducted to outline planning parameters and 
limitations. 
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? An information request letter was mailed to the key planning staff members 
for all 50 states in the United States, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico 
and other key stakeholder in Florida.  The responses received were then 
used to assess the current condition and/or need for this study in the planning 
practices currently underway in their respective states.  The responses were 
also used to determine staging scenarios involving deployment nationwide. 
? An online questionnaire (http://home.earthlink.net/~securityplanning/) was 
developed and administered to obtain general perceptions about the 
transportation planning process and security concerns.  The survey was 
distributed, via email notification, in January of 2006 to about 500 recipients, 
all of whom reside in Florida.  The recipients were comprised of planners, 
engineers, and private citizens.  The responses were used to determine 
perceived needs in the transportation planning process, as related to security 
considerations.   
? Interviews were conducted with leading transportation officials and private 
security experts to develop initial guidelines and to determine effectiveness 
and utility of proposed modifications to the existing process. 
1.7.1 Data Instrument 
 For the purposes of this study, a questionnaire provided the most 
interesting prospects for feedback and real-time data for consideration.  The 
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questionnaire addressed various aspects of transportation planning at various 
stages of commitment, incorporating the necessity to implement enhanced 
security measures that will provide additional protection against a variety of 
events that could potentially lead to harm or damage to system infrastructures.   
 The questionnaire involved questions that required a simple yes or no 
response. Responses varied depending upon their role in the process and their 
assessment of current conditions.  The questionnaire instrument required a 
specific method of implementation in order to obtain a wide variety of responses 
and important results for consideration.  For the purposes of this study, it was 
estimated that an online questionnaire would offer the most effective means of 
gathering data and obtaining a wide variety of responses from participants all 
over the State of Florida.  The advantages of this method included the following: 
1. These types of surveys are relatively inexpensive; 
2. Limited personal information was required for dissemination to 
participants; and 
3. Online questionnaires enabled participants to have more time than in 
other strategies, where there may be specific time constraints in place. 
 Since the questionnaires required some thought and consideration of a 
number of transportation-related issues, the researcher provided ample time for 
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completion and submission of these surveys.  The research study required that 
these questionnaires discuss a number of issues relative to transportation 
planning, strategic development, as well as current and future needs.   The 
questionnaires made available to participants were identical in nature, and 
therefore, all questions were simple yet specific enough to provide sufficient 
detailed information for examination and evaluation.  Since the target participant 
population was educated and possessed an acceptable level of intelligence, 
these questionnaires did not present too many challenges in terms of completion.  
Each questionnaire contained questions that could be divided into three sections, 
with a section emphasizing each of the following primary issues: 
1. Security; 
2. Perceptions of Transportation Planning; and 
3. Federal, State, and Local support strategies  
 The questionnaire was developed as a 30-item scale, with questions 
related to each designated section.  Participants were required to complete all 
questions in order to have their responses counted as valid in the evaluation 
process.  Each questionnaire was brief, with a short explanation at the beginning 
of the online form to discuss the specifics of the submission process.  Emails 
were sent to various State and Local agencies throughout the state with links to 
the questionnaire site, as well as a disclaimer regarding the confidentiality of this 
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information.  No names or other personal information were used in the study with 
the exception of the individual’s affiliation or relationship to transportation 
planning, and these records will remain confidential at all times. It was critical that 
each participant was notified of confidentiality, since there were concerns 
regarding the content of the questionnaire or liability or perceived endorsement 
related to their answers.  The protection of each participant's identity was of 
primary concern for the researcher, and therefore, great lengths were taken to 
promote confidentiality at all times throughout the process. 
1.8 Study Organization 
 This study is organized as follows: 
? Chapter 1 - Introduction and Approach:  This chapter includes a discussion of 
the problem statement, value and significance of research, study limitations, 
and methodology. 
? Chapter 2 - Literature Review:  This chapter documents the state of practice 
as determined by a thorough literature review. 
? Chapter 3 - Framework for Security Planning:  This chapter outlines the 
legislative and regulatory instruments involved in security planning along with 
agencies involved in the process and the current project development 
process. 
13 
 
? Chapter 4 – Survey Results:  This chapter includes analysis and discussion of 
results obtained from the information request letter mailed to the state 
Department’s of Transportation and analysis and discussion of results 
obtained from the security planning questionnaire that was administered 
online. 
? Chapter 5 - Revised Project Development Process:  This chapter reflects the 
new and revised PD&E process that explicitly incorporates security 
considerations into the process 
? Chapter 6 - Conclusions and Recommendations:  This chapter summarizes 
the study by stating conclusions about the research and recommendations for 
improvement to the planning process and recommendations for further 
research. 
? References:  This section contains references to all literature quoted or 
referenced in this study. 
? Bibliography:  This section contains references to all literature that was 
studied, but not directly used, in this study. 
? Appendix A – Acronyms:  This appendix defines all acronyms used in the 
study and report.  
? Appendix B – List of State Security Contacts:  This appendix lists all of the 
recipients of the initial request letter. 
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? Appendix C – Sample Request Letter to State Planning Agencies:  This 
appendix presents a sample of the request letter that was sent to all planning 
agencies as listed in Appendix B. 
? Appendix D – State Responses to Inquiry Letter:  This appendix documents 
all responses from the request letters. 
? Appendix E – Key Transportation Legislation:  This appendix contains a 
description of key transportation legislation and regulations. 
? Appendix F - Transportation Planning and Security Agencies:  This appendix 
contains a description of key transportation agencies involved in the 
transportation planning process. 
? About the Author:  This section gives an overview of the author. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
 There are many challenges involved in maintaining an effective and 
secure transportation system in modern society, and therefore, it is often very 
difficult to identify resources and strategies for improving these processes without 
specific attention to past research and case studies regarding the proposed topic.  
For the purposes of this study, existing research regarding security issues in 
transportation was evaluated for contribution to new strategies for improvement 
in this arena, and specifically, research concerning the State of Florida was 
particularly advantageous in promoting change and progress.  The following 
discussion will identify and evaluate various resources from existing literature 
that provided insights into security and safety concerns in modern transportation 
systems throughout the State. 
 As a part of this study, an in-depth literature review was conducted to 
determine the state-of-the-industry with regards to transportation security 
planning.  This review included obtainable literature, both written and online, from 
a variety of sources including government, education, and industry.  As a result 
of that review, several topic areas emerged.  Even though all of these topics are 
16 
 
not fully explored as a part of this study, they must be considered in the 
transportation planning process. 
2.1 Emerging Transportation Security Issues 
 A report generated by Dillingham (2003) identifies many of the emerging 
threats to and concerns of modern transportation systems, which have 
significantly increased since September 11th.  During the identification process, 
many weaknesses in security have been noted, including flaws in the luggage 
screening process at airports, easy access to restricted areas at airports, and 
limitations in air traffic control towers with respect to security measures 
(Dillingham 2003).  With these weaknesses in mind, it is not surprising that the 
federal government continues to reassess its priorities with respect to homeland 
security and transportation protection, and substantial measures have been 
taken to ensure that these problems are resolved and new solutions are 
implemented on a long-term basis (Dillingham 2003). 
 With respect to mass transit alternatives, the Federal Transit 
Administration (FTA) established its own set of security initiatives in order to 
accommodate the needs of passengers and these systems as a whole 
(Dillingham 2003).  Furthermore, it has been suggested that funding for transit 
security initiatives should be allocated from a variety of resources as a means of 
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facilitating new strategies for security improvements across these systems 
(Dillingham 2003).  However, the challenges of enhancing security in 
transportation systems continue to cause concern in federal, state and local 
agencies, although immediate and long-term planning initiatives involving risk 
assessments have been created (Dillingham 2003).  However, there are 
additional considerations with regards to funding such programs, as there is 
limited funding in place, which is far below the projected estimates required to 
fund these strategies (Dillingham 2003).  Furthermore, it is necessary to consider 
that human contributions to enhancing transportation planning processes are just 
as significant as financial considerations, as the knowledge and expertise that 
these contributors bring to the mix are critical to the long-term development of 
key strategic initiatives in transportation planning (Dillingham 2003).  
Nonetheless, transportation security initiatives are still in their infancy stages, as 
there are still marked vulnerabilities across these channels that are difficult to 
ignore: 
“Today, we have better intelligence, coordination, and 
communication; we have plans to alert the public to threats; and we 
are all more alert to the possibility of threats.  Yet major 
vulnerabilities remain, particularly in air cargo, general aviation, 
mass transit, and port security…Addressing these vulnerabilities 
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will continue to require risk assessments and plans that balance 
security concerns against mobility needs, and that consider how 
much the nation can afford to spend for security improvements in 
light of other, competing demands for limited funds” (Dillingham 
2003).  
 These challenges continue to provide particularly difficult circumstances 
for transportation planners, and although the federal government possesses 
considerable influence in advancing these objectives, they also serve as a 
limiting factor in inciting change and progress, due in large part to the lack of 
funding for such programs on a widespread basis (Dillingham 2003).  It appears 
that in many instances, limited funding opportunities are secured for only larger 
metropolitan.  However, there are many other regions throughout the United 
States that also face abundant threats of different types that require the attention 
and financial resources of the federal government in order to advance security 
measures into the coming years.  
 The optimization of resources serves as a key indicator of advanced 
initiatives for transportation planning processes.  Berrick (2005) argues that 
continuous federal funding for transportation security initiatives requires that the 
President, Congress and the Senate must agree upon the key objectives for 
promoting advanced security capabilities in all types of transportation systems.  
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However, it should be noted that by integrating resources from all agencies into 
one cooperative system is likely to serve as the most feasible alternative in 
advancing transportation security initiatives to the next level (Berrick 2005).  
Therefore, the consolidation of efforts from one agency to the next is one of the 
most effective strategies in developing a cohesive effort that will facilitate 
transportation planning as desired (Berrick 2005).  It is often necessary to 
reconstruct programs or strategies from the ground up in advancing these 
objectives; however, this strategy requires extensive time, capital and other 
resources that might not be readily available for use (Berrick 2005).  Therefore, it 
is possible that integrating new models and strategies one at a time is perhaps 
the most effective strategy to ensure that transportation planning progresses to 
the next level without falling behind in the process (Berrick 2005).  With this in 
mind, it is important to identify the critical steps in advancing transportation 
planning to the next level, achieving those steps on an individual basis, and then 
moving on to more advanced initiatives as time and funding permit (Berrick 
2005).  Transportation planners must assume responsibility for their actions and 
must affirm their commitment to these strategies as a primary means of 
advancing transportation to a new level, one that will provide the best possible 
outcomes for the end users (Berrick 2005). 
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 Because of changes in our security state resulting from increased terrorist 
activity, it is absolutely imperative that the transportation planning process more 
thoroughly consider security implications when planning, screening, and 
selecting projects.  The National Research Council (1999) identified scenarios 
(Table 2-1) that would be considered in the United States Department of 
Transportation Vulnerability Assessment.  
 Even though these possibilities have been published since 1999, little has 
been done to accommodate these concerns into the transportation planning 
process.  These issues have found refuge in the operations, maintenance, and 
emergency response arenas.  It is necessary to bring these issues forward into 
the early planning processes in order to better control the possibilities. 
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Table 2-1 
Vulnerability Assessment Scenarios 
1. Car bomb at bridge approach 
2. Series of small explosives on highway bridge 
3. Single small explosive on highway bridge 
4. Single small explosive in highway tunnel 
5. Car bomb in highway tunnel 
6. Series of car bombs on adjacent bridges or tunnels 
7. Bomb detonated at pipeline compressor stations 
8. Bomb detonated at pipeline storage facility 
9. Bomb detonated on pipeline segment 
10. Simultaneous attacks on ports 
11. Bombing of waterfront pavilion 
12. Container vessel fire at marine terminal 
13. Ramming of railroad bridge by maritime vessel 
14. Attack on passenger vessel in port 
15. Shooting in rail station 
16. Vehicle bomb adjacent to rail station 
17. Bombing of airport transit station 
18. Bombing of underwater transit tunnel 
19. Bus bombing 
20. Deliberate blocking of highway rail grade crossing 
21. Bombing of rail tunnel 
22. Bomb detonated on train in rail station 
23. Vandalism of track structure and signal system 
24. Bombing of rail bridge 
25. Explosives attack on multiple rail bridges 
26. Explosive in cargo of passenger aircraft 
27. Biological release in multiple subway stations 
28. Anthrax release from freight ship 
29. Anthrax release in transit station 
30. Anthrax release on passenger train 
31. Sarin release in multiple subway stations 
32. Physical attack on railcar carrying toxics 
33. Cyber attack on highway traffic control system 
34. Cyber attack on pipeline control system 
35. Attack on port power/telecommunications 
36. Sabotage of train control system 
37. Tampering with rail signals 
38. Cyber attack on train control center 
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 A literature review on this subject has to-date revealed very little directly 
concerning the subject matter.  Literature reviewed to date is broken into the 
following security considerations that will be focal issues during the study.   
? General Planning Needs 
? Modal Integration 
? Mode Attractiveness 
? System Redundancy 
? Application Of Technology 
? Cost And Funding Priorities 
? System Performance 
? System Interdependency 
? Land Use Interaction 
? Risk Assessment 
? Public Participation 
? Information Availability 
? Planning Levels:  Federal, State, Local 
? Organizational Structure 
? Legal Considerations 
? Facility Design 
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2.2 General Planning Needs 
 Transportation processes have become increasingly complex over the 
past decade, as issues related to security have increased in importance on a 
widespread basis across the United States.  It is very difficult to develop new 
strategies for security improvements when the appropriate financial resources 
are unavailable, or if there are political or leadership challenges involved in these 
processes.  It is increasingly difficult to develop processes that incorporate the 
appropriate level of security measures, especially since there are governmental 
bodies and leaders that are unable to secure the proper level of support and 
financial resources to perform such tasks as effectively as required.  Therefore, 
there are considerable challenges that are evident in modern transportation 
systems, as the ability to advance security is not always readily available without 
modifying these systems dramatically in scope and premise. 
 It has been recognized by several individuals that there is a need for 
considering security in the transportation planning process.  Khattak (2002) 
concurred that there was no substantial literature on transportation security 
planning prior to the September 11th attacks.  Dillingham (2003) recently dealt 
with the issue of long term challenges to transportation security.  He identifies 
five major challenges.  These are: 
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1. developing a comprehensive transportation risk management approach; 
2. ensuring that transportation security funding needs are identified and 
prioritized and that costs are controlled; 
3. establishing effective coordination among the many public and private 
entities responsible for transportation security; 
4. ensuring adequate workforce competence and staffing levels; and 
5. Implementing security standards for transportation facilities, workers, and 
security equipment.   
 A comprehensive planning effort is necessary for each of these five 
challenges to be met. 
 Flynn (2000) iterates that there is a need for “An ambitious, 
comprehensive approach” to raise awareness, advance standards, promote 
partnerships, and get adequate resources.  Flynn also believes that 
transportation security cannot be treated as a “secondary or even tertiary issue.” 
 Khattak (2002) reiterates the idea that the September 11 events have 
increased the importance of national security.  Most of the events and incidents 
shared success because they were largely unexpected.  They exposed “gaps” in 
security planning.  The gaps included lack of identification of critical assets and 
security concerns in the transportation system, planning and preparation by 
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governments, and erroneous perceptions of security risk by the general 
population. 
 Dornan and Maier’s white paper (2005) serves as a strong example of a 
key strategic process involved in planning for transportation security needs on a 
long-term basis.  The authors indicate that in developing any type of wide-range 
transportation planning strategy, the following elements must be considered as 
critical factors in these processes: 
? Provide support for economic development and stability in larger metropolitan 
areas, where there is the greatest opportunity to engage in globalization 
efforts and to promote competition; 
? In planning for any type of transportation, there must be a long-term safety 
and security process in place to ensure that all users are protected as best as 
possible; 
? Facilitate new and innovative options for transportation users so that their 
needs are met, particularly if they are unable to utilize traditional methods; 
? All transportation planning efforts must encourage protecting the environment 
from harm while allowing individuals to experience an enhanced quality of life 
whenever possible; 
? Enable transportation routes to be efficient at all times, facilitating a greater 
level of communication and ease in travel for all users; 
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? Facilitate the effective management and cohesiveness of all transportation 
system operations; and to 
? Allow existing forms of transportation to maintain their effectiveness and to 
encourage their efficiency under any and all circumstances 
 These criteria serve as critical markers in the maintenance of current 
transportation processes, and they also provide a glimpse into the possibilities 
that are available to facilitate effective security measures into these processes, 
without interrupting the flow and progress of these systems as they are currently 
maintained. 
2.3 Modal Integration 
 In determining the best possible course of action regarding security for a 
given transportation system, it is necessary to identify and understand the level 
of progress that has already been made.  There are a number of key issues to 
consider in developing transportation strategies that incorporate mode specific 
security needs into their processes, and a white paper created by Dornan and 
Maier (2005) addresses such issues in a comprehensive and detailed format.  
This paper begins with an introduction to the issues that have emerged since the 
September 11th terrorist attacks, which have created new challenges for 
transportation experts with regards to systemwide planning and strategic 
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development on a long-term basis, including issues facing general operations 
and the sustainability of such systems over time (Dornan and Maier 2005).  It is 
advantageous for field experts to begin to manage these challenges with an all-
inclusive examination of current modal processes, many of which may appear 
outdated and ill-equipped to accommodate emerging security needs; however, 
there is a marked lack of understanding between what is perceived as critical and 
how to promote such issues in modern systems (Dornan and Maier 2005).  With 
this in mind, it is not surprising that transportation planners continue to struggle in 
their efforts to identify the specific problems of each system and to develop 
strategies to overcome these problems without lengthy or severe interruptions to 
current processes, which might cause even further delays in maintaining 
adequate systems on a long-term basis (Dornan and Maier 2005).  Nonetheless, 
these challenges must be faced directly and without fear, as transportation 
continues to evolve and to require the expertise and support of a wide body of 
groups in order to thrive, since individuals depend upon transportation in order to 
conduct their lives normally and without serious disturbance to their routines. 
 Polzin (2002) indicates that inter-system connectivity could be impeded by 
security concerns.  The transportation industry has encouraged intermodal 
connectivity.  Florida, along with other states, has been considering a high-speed 
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rail for several years.  These initiatives will most likely be affected and impaired 
by the incorporation of security concerns into the planning process.  
 Khattak (2002) discusses the need for a comprehensive approach, with 
security in mind.  This comprehensive approach must include different 
transportation modes. 
2.4 Mode Attractiveness 
 Modal attractiveness, both existing and influenced, is an important factor 
for transportation planners.  Being able to determine the modal split is a 
fundamental consideration in the transportation and traffic modeling systems.  It 
seems logical that if a planning study does not consider transportation alternative 
to be viable due to concerns associated with the security of that mode then the 
attractiveness of that mode would be artificially altered as a result of that finding.  
This would most likely be a short term effect due to the resilience of modal 
patrons and the dependency of those users on the systems.  However, it could 
prove annoying and difficult to properly analyze revenue potential of a particular 
mode and to deal with other long-term planning issues such as infrastructure 
needs.  There should be sensitivity to the effects of identifying modes, routes or 
infrastructure that are more vulnerable to security issues.  Polzin (2002) 
discusses the issue of modal attractiveness in light of September 11th.  He 
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discusses the impacts that September 11th had on the airline industry and the 
subsequent shift in mode choice.  He also discusses the possible discrepancies 
that could occur as a result of mode based security funding differentials.  These 
differentials, or publicly perceived differentials, could greatly influence modal 
attractiveness. 
2.5 System Redundancy 
 It is most important to recognize that in promoting new security measures 
for implementation in modern transportation systems, any number of possible 
scenarios or opportunities for security mishaps can occur, such as with natural 
disasters or with threats of terrorism.  Transportation planning processes have 
long been ill-equipped to handle these types of threats, which have exposed 
serious defects in how these systems account for emergencies, regardless of 
their source (Dornan and Maier 2005).  These flaws could potentially lead to fatal 
errors if they occur, and therefore, it is critical that transportation planning 
strategists are well-prepared to manage these challenges on a widespread and 
long-term basis (Dornan and Maier 2005). 
 System redundancy can provide alternative transportation modes and 
routes when available.  A traditional utility of redundancy is that of alternatives 
associated with primary system failure as a result of events, such as crashes, or 
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lack of capacity.  The value of redundancy is clear when observed from the 
user’s perspective.  However, the value becomes less apparent or is mitigated 
when dealing with funding these redundant systems.  Honea (2000) ventured into 
the topic of the planning of excess capacity.  Excess capacity was recognized as 
a necessity for the national defense.  Certain types of industries, like the rail 
industry, struggle to redeploy or add capacity due to the fixed nature of their 
infrastructure.  This occurs even in the presence of reliable demand forecasts 
that justify the need for additional capacity.  Other modes, like containers, deal 
with a trade imbalance of high import, low export of containers.  Therefore, ships 
are already making trips with empty containers.  For example, in the port of New 
York, there is not enough staging area.  Excess capacity for redundancy or 
capacity considerations is extremely difficult and costly.  New York is not alone in 
this dilemma.  Every port in the eastern United States faces this problem as the 
public demands greater access to water fronts.  Morgan (2000) believes that the 
existing surface transportation system has a tremendous amount of redundancy 
built in as evidenced by the system’s rapid recovery after natural disasters. 
2.6 Application Of Technology 
 Technology presents many tools to be used in the transportation operation 
and maintenance processes.  Some of these tools may have limited utility when 
planning for security.  For example, the use of Intelligent Transportation Systems 
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(ITS) and databases for drivers license processing hold great potential for 
preventing security events through detection of potential terrorists before they 
have the opportunity to strike.  However, the value of those technologies is 
unclear when dealing with planning of infrastructure.  The installation and 
operation of these technologies requires coordination and the utility in the 
planning phase needs to be completely explored. 
 In the modern world, technology infiltrates almost each and every aspect 
of existence in one way or another.  In transportation planning, technology is 
utilized in many different areas, as there are specific needs that are best 
accommodated through technological means.  Therefore, it is not surprising that 
transportation systems have evolved in recent years utilizing a combination of 
computer-based and other technology-based solutions in order to satisfy all 
desired objectives.  A study conducted by Siwek and Associates (1999) 
examines the implementation of ITS as a means of promoting change and 
progress within these systems in order to provide a greater level of service for 
users.  In order to satisfy the ever-changing needs of technology-based solutions 
in modern transportation systems, the Intermodal Surface Transportation 
Efficiency Act (ISTEA) of 1991 was established as a means of promoting 
efficiency and advanced solutions to problems in transportation systems (Siwek 
and Associates 1999).  ITS has evolved over time as a primary method of 
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providing exemplary service to transportation users, and it offers a greater level 
of understanding of the challenges of modern transportation systems, including 
but not limited to emergency response (Siwek and Associates 1999).   However, 
the integration of various technologies into transportation systems has always 
been a challenge for leaders and experts in the field, as existing frameworks 
have often been unequipped to manage these challenges without serious 
interruptions to service (Siwek and Associates 1999).  Nonetheless, there are 
considerable advantages to the implementation of these technologies, as they 
provide a greater level of efficiency, increased response times, and financial 
savings over the long term (Siwek and Associates 1999).  It is expected that with 
continuous improvement on strategies incorporating emerging technologies, 
these systems, in theory, will be prepared for security events, such as terrorist 
threats or attacks (Siwek and Associates 1999).  In determining the best possible 
course of action for a given transportation system, it is necessary to conduct the 
following evaluation: “As part of plan development, State or regional goals, 
objectives and performance measures can be identified to take into account how 
transportation facilities and services address, now and in the future, the social, 
environmental and economic goals of the State or region” (Siwek and Associates 
1999).  It is not surprising that these objectives represent tremendous challenges 
for many transportation systems, as their existing frameworks may not be 
prepared to identify or to manage such goals.  However, they must be ultimately 
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incorporated into existing systems as a means of promoting change, progress, 
and to enhance existing security measures to satisfy users (Siwek and 
Associates 1999).  In general, ITS serves two primary purposes, that of providing 
information to users so that these systems work more efficiently for their needs, 
and to provide improvements to general operations that will ensure long-term 
efficiencies at the operations level (Siwek and Associates 1999).  Since there are 
a number of options available in the ITS portfolio, decisions regarding these 
systems must be made with considerations of current processes, the end users, 
and the entire well being of the system in question (Siwek and Associates 1999). 
 Although ITS serves as a helpful strategy in promoting progress 
throughout a given transportation system, it is necessary to consider these 
alternatives as only one component of a larger and more widespread set of 
strategies for implementation (Siwek and Associates 1999).  In other words, ITS 
could potentially serve as the backbone or driving force of any given system, but 
it should not be the sole solution, as it is not capable of accommodating all 
possible system needs (Siwek and Associates 1999).  Therefore, continuous 
improvement strategies must ultimately be considered as one of the key 
indicators of advanced progress in transportation systems (Siwek and Associates 
1999).  Other challenges remain that must also be evaluated and modified when 
necessary, and these include the following: 
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? Developing a greater understanding of ITS and its role with the cooperation of 
a variety of public and private agencies involved in transportation planning; 
? Developing the technical capacity that is necessary to accommodate ITS 
initiatives of all types; 
? Developing the capabilities that are necessary to implement and support ITS 
on a widespread basis; 
? Evaluating all financial opportunities and limitations, many of which may 
require the support of members of private agencies (Siwek and Associates 
1999). 
 It is not surprising that many transportation systems require extensive 
modifications to their existing processes in order to adapt to ITS, but these 
objectives may be realized with a concentrated effort from all involved parties 
(Siwek and Associates 1999). 
 It is important to identify locations that have successfully implemented ITS 
strategies into their existing transportation systems.  For example, Chicago, IL 
possesses a complex network of associations amongst various agencies and 
other groups that are involved in transportation planning and implementation, and 
these groups have been successful in effectively communicating with each other 
through an established committee known as the Metropolitan Area Mayors’ 
Caucus (Volpe Center 2000).  By utilizing this committee to communicate ideas, 
35 
 
express concerns, and share challenges, Chicago has been able to satisfy a 
number of objectives with respect to transportation systems, and this serves as a 
strong example of change and the ability to work cohesively towards a common 
goal (Volpe Center 2000).  It is important in developing any transportation 
planning strategy involving ITS to perform the following: 
? Include stakeholders from local and regional groups in order to secure the 
support of these key players in ITS strategies; 
? Provide knowledge and information to local officials with respect to ITS so 
that the decision-making process is effectively promoted and implemented; 
? Initiate project development strategies for future use, all of which depend 
upon ITS information that is readily available for use; 
? Provide information to the general public regarding ITS, so that all objectives 
are appropriately communicated to the end users; 
? Engage in networking strategies that will facilitate shared knowledge and 
resources; and 
? Develop the appropriate strategies with respect to collecting data for use in 
ITS implementation (Volpe Center 2000). 
 These objectives serve as important indicators of the overall 
receptiveness of ITS planners, stakeholders, and general public involvement in 
any projects that may occur (Volpe Center 2000).   With these strategies in place, 
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ITS initiatives are likely to be well received by key stakeholders and the general 
public at large. 
 Another key example of the success of an ITS initiative is Miami, FL, 
whereby an active committee was formed in order to identify the capabilities and 
advantages of ITS systems within existing transportation frameworks, and the 
committee included members of many different organizations, as a means of 
understanding how these changes could shape the direction of transportation 
planning in future years (Volpe Center 2000).  With the committee firmly in place, 
a variety of ITS initiatives have been considered across the State of Florida, with 
specific concentrations in fiber optic connectivity and other related technologies 
(Volpe Center 2000).  These opportunities have provided some insights into the 
current gaps in technology and strategy that have been observed, due in part to 
a prior lack of knowledge and resources for implementation (Volpe Center 2000).  
However, with respect to these challenges, the committee has created new 
strategies for consideration and possible implementation in future years (Volpe 
Center 2000). 
 Other considerations for transportation planning involving ITS must 
include the widespread dissemination of knowledge and information regarding 
these processes to elected leaders and other officials (Volpe Center 2000).  
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According to the text, after this educational endeavor had taken place in the 
Dallas-Fort Worth area,  
“Including both elected officials and technical staff enhanced these 
discussions and improved communications between the two groups 
in terms of their expectations from ITS products and services. 
Operations staff gained a better understanding of the nontechnical 
concerns of the elected officials, and elected officials better 
understood the level of effort and timelines associated with 
deploying ITS projects” (Volpe Center 2000) 
 These initiatives are particularly important in facilitating the change that is 
necessary in providing the best possible measures for security and related 
support across all transportation systems, as they offer the appropriate personnel 
the knowledge and information that is required to make educated and well 
informed decisions that are likely to influence transportation systems in positive 
ways (Volpe Center 2000).  Furthermore, it should be noted that transportation 
planning without the implementation of ITS initiatives will not be successful in 
providing effective options for end users, who serve as the most critical receivers 
of these systems (Volpe Center 2000).  With this in mind, it is critical to continue 
the education and advancement of ITS initiatives for leaders, officials, experts, 
and even the end users (Volpe Center 2000).  
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2.7 Cost And Funding Priorities 
 Costs associated with security planning can consist of both direct and 
indirect costs.  Direct costs can include design, construction, maintenance, and 
operation of improvements for both retrofit and new projects.  Indirect costs can 
include right-of-way value impacts, cost of additional labor, tourism impacts, 
investment attractiveness, and delays associated with changing priorities.  It is 
common in current practices to consider these costs when making transportation 
decisions.  These considerations usually take the form of Benefit/Cost analyses.  
The current practices do not assign quantifiable benefits to a particular security 
consideration.  Therefore, it is not possible to adequately incorporate those 
considerations into the analyses.   
 Transportation planning strategies serve as a substantial portion of the 
United States gross economic product, with approximately $1 trillion in spending 
on an annual basis (Dornan and Maier 2005).  This figure is highly significant, as 
it represents a relatively large portion of federal spending for programs, and since 
transportation infiltrates almost every aspect of daily living, this funding must be 
expended wisely and without waste in order to preserve the integrity of these 
processes (Dornan and Maier 2005).  With the increased interest in promoting 
security within these processes, it is not surprising that continuous assessments 
of transportation planning must take place in order to utilize such allocations as 
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best as possible so that residents are protected and supported by their own tax 
dollars (Dornan and Maier 2005).  However, transportation planning has long 
been weak in many of these areas, as there have been considerable flaws in 
how security measures are provided to the public, their flexibility, and their overall 
long-term sustainability, considering the financial resources that are available for 
use (Dornan and Maier 2005).   
 There is considerable evidence to suggest that transportation planning 
strategies require a complex evaluation of current processes and routine needs 
assessments in order to promote change and progress regarding security 
measures.  For example, some of the key required steps include financial 
forecasting of projected costs regarding operations and new program 
implementation; the utilization of existing land versus new land requirements; the 
feasibility of growth opportunities in existing regions in order to accommodate 
new users; the ability to utilize new and existing capital resources to maximize 
transportation opportunities; and identify areas of weakness and the potential for 
widespread improvements that will best influence transportation system users 
without serious interruptions to daily activities (Dornan and Maier 2005).   
 The development of modified transportation planning processes requires 
extensive funding from a wide variety of sponsors, including federal, state and 
local agencies.  Federal funding is especially critical in developing new security 
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strategies for transportation, and there is a general rule that as spending is 
incurred upon approval of a given project, costs will be reimbursed by the federal 
government for the work that is performed in a given location (The Metropolitan 
Transportation Planning Process 2004).  Each year, Congress is responsible for 
allocating a specific amount of funding for specific projects deemed necessary for 
the general operations of the U.S. Department of Transportation, with specific 
spending guidelines for many programs (The Metropolitan Transportation 
Planning Process 2004).  Much of this funding is required to maintain existing 
operations within a given location; however, some project-specific funding is 
usually available for facilitating new programs that may include measures for 
security and other related issues (The Metropolitan Transportation Planning 
Process 2004).  It is expected that as these needs arise, funding will be 
requested by states and local governments for specific projects, and that 
transportation experts, upon notification of funding, will implement their chosen 
strategies in order to promote greater effectiveness in the transportation planning 
process (The Metropolitan Transportation Planning Process 2004).   
 There are many different aspects of the transportation planning process 
that require specific attention to security details as well as measures for long-
term improvements.  With the specific allocations by the federal government 
provided on an annual basis, it is not surprising that an ever-increasing amount 
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of funding is being allocated for security-specific projects; nonetheless, there are 
many weaknesses in these plans, due in large part to funding constraints at all 
levels.  Simply put, the amount of funding allocated for security strategies is still 
relatively low, which challenges transportation planners to develop additional 
cost-effective measures for supporting security needs in metropolitan areas and 
beyond. 
 Funding for transportation projects can be controlled, in both amount and 
allocation, by many factors.  Unfortunately, security is not one of them.  Safety is 
a very prominent factor in that it can generate funds in a very short time frame.  
For instance, in Florida, if a hurricane causes a high degree of scour on a major 
bridge that requires replacement of that structure, that project will receive priority 
funding due the importance of that linkage to the regional interests and the safety 
concerns associated with leaving the existing bridge.  However, the new bridge 
may not receive additional funds to enhance its security attributes.  Changes to 
existing systems will not go unchallenged because the addition of a single factor 
will cause competition for limited funds with other projects.   
 Dillingham (2003) addresses funding and risk management issues.  The 
most critical funding criteria are identified as ridership level, population, identified 
vulnerabilities, and criticality of assets.  Funds should also use risk-based criteria 
for fund distribution.  Two key funding and accountability challenges will be (1) 
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paying for increased transportation security and (2) ensuring that these costs are 
controlled.  The funding estimates for security projects do not come close to 
matching the project demand.  In August 2002, the Congress appropriated $93 
million to fund security improvements at the nation’s 361 ports in fiscal year 
2002, but the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) received applications 
for as much as $697 million for these improvements.  This is a differential of $604 
million between what is provided and what is needed. 
 Polzin (2002) summarized the resource pressures resulting from security 
concerns as: 
? Diversion of resources to security needs outside of transportation programs 
? Diversion of funds to operating security enforcement, policing, planning, 
training 
? Diversion of funds to capital investments in security (i.e. barriers, fencing, 
inspection) 
? Use of funds to support network redundancy/connectivity 
? Use of funds to support modal choice/redundancy 
 The President’s Fiscal Year 2005 Budget calls for significant increases in 
the security budget.  The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has a proposed 
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doubling of funding for counterterrorism and counterintelligence.  This equates to 
44% of their total budget (Table 2-2). (2004) 
Table 2-2 
FBI Funding For FY2005 
Element Budget (US$) Percentage (%) 
Construction $1,242,000 0.02%
Forensic $166,615,000 3.26%
Security $262,083,000 5.12%
National Security $2,241,114,000 43.81%
Criminal $1,638,867,000 32.04%
Cyber Investigations $283,041,000 5.53%
Technology Investments $522,308,000 10.21%
TOTAL $5,115,270,000 100.00%
2.8 System Performance 
 Polzin (2002) discusses the issue of system performance as the “most 
obvious area of impact to transportation.”  He proposes that security concerns 
can impact the following performance measures: 
? Cost to user 
? Speed 
? Accessibility 
? Reliability 
? Safety/security 
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? Convenience 
? Connectivity 
 The consideration of security in the planning process will mean a 
redefining of traditional performance criteria and formulas. 
2.9 System Interdependency 
 Currently, most systems are evaluated independently when dealing with 
planning, design, funding, operation, and maintenance considerations.  This is 
partially driven by the condition that systems are funded through different means 
that are directly related to the type of system.  For example, federal roadway 
resurfacing dollars are not normally used to fund a new bus station along a 
roadway.  The current transportation planning process struggles to consider 
different modes or systems collectively or it simply considers them 
independently.  This is not a desirable situation from a security planning 
perspective or from an overall efficiency standpoint.  The planning processes 
should take into consideration the interdependency of these systems in 
evaluating security issues and in resources allocations.  Morgan (2000) stated 
that the Department of Transportation should implement Research and 
Development, for security, across transportation modes, not separately for each 
mode. 
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 It is strongly suggested that all transportation planning processes must 
account for enhanced security measures and objectives whenever possible.  
However, these goals are very difficult to achieve and maintain without a specific 
strategy, which involves a variety of public agencies and private groups, as well 
as general public awareness of the possible threats to the security of these 
systems.  An article by Nelson (1999) examines these associations in greater 
detail, noting that there are many challenges involved in building cohesive and 
effective associations amongst these different groups, as they each possess their 
own agendas and objectives, many of which may not be supportive of one 
another.  The article suggests that in preparing any transportation system for the 
real threat of terrorist attacks, all organizations involved in the planning process 
must develop what is known as a “dress rehearsal,” whereby all parties work 
together in conjunction with each other in a mock disaster incident, so that each 
team is aware of the responsibilities involved in achieving all desired objectives 
(Nelson 1999).  In any transit system, there must be a comprehensive evaluation 
of entrance and exit points, where many users are likely to be found waiting for 
their chosen mode of transportation to arrive and depart (Nelson 1999).  These 
locations are particularly vulnerable to potential acts of terrorism, since terrorists 
are indeed aware of the increased numbers of users at these points, thereby 
creating the potential for mass destruction in one concentrated area (Nelson 
1999).  Furthermore, fuel used for buses, electrical switches, train or rail tracks, 
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and computer systems must be continuously evaluated for any unexpected 
changes or threats (Nelson 1999).  These steps are necessary in the 
development of any routine transportation planning process, and officials must 
not take these concerns for granted, since it is possible that terrorists may 
identify these vulnerabilities and take dangerous action if it is known that there 
are weaknesses in a given system (Nelson 1999).  The author also notes that 
there must be comprehensive and detailed evaluation strategies in place at all 
times, since passengers must be protected from additional harm whenever 
possible (Nelson 1999).  The author states that “Evacuation plans should include 
the selection of staging areas, where passengers can await transport to safe 
locations…if possible; alternatives to the affected transit line or system must be 
established in order to diminish the crowds that would otherwise accumulate at 
the scene” (Nelson 1999).  Therefore, it is strongly suggested that emergency 
response plans must incorporate these types of objectives into the mix, since 
there is a strong likelihood of serious damage and casualties if these plans are 
not considered prior to an attack (Nelson 1999).  If at all possible, the 
development of emergency response plans that include the evaluation of 
possible tampering of systems and vulnerable areas is particularly advantageous 
in developing an effective security planning process (Nelson 1999).  Much of the 
lack of preparedness for terrorist threats to transportation systems has been in 
faulty designs and the lack of knowledge regarding threats when these systems 
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were created; therefore, it is often required that systems must undergo 
modifications in order to update equipment, exit and entrance locations, and 
computer systems in order to better recognize threats that may occur, as well as 
to better prepare users for the possibilities that might exist, allowing them to 
increase their awareness of such events (Nelson 1999).      
 It is also expected that as transportation planning initiatives continue to 
emerge throughout the United States, there must be considerable measures in 
place that will accommodate the many users of public transit systems, including 
buses, railways, and subways.  However, prior to the development of any revised 
guidelines for emergency preparedness in transportation systems, the following 
assessments must be conducted and evaluated: 
1. A general risk assessment must be performed in order to evaluate the 
potential threats against a system in a given location; 
2. The likelihood of serious hazards stemming from acts of terrorism must 
also be considered; and 
3. There must be a comprehensive strategy in place to manage any 
perceived risks or hazards that might occur as a result of a terrorist attack 
or threat (Boyd and Sullivan 2000).   
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 There is a critical need in transportation planning processes to evaluate 
and consider the long-term outcomes of terrorist acts or threats, since these may 
incite fear in passengers, leading to a reduction in use of such systems over 
time.  Therefore, if passengers are assured that their time spent in the transit 
system is as secure as possible; there is a greater likelihood that these 
circumstances will be managed more effectively and without serious 
consequences.  Nonetheless, passengers must also be assured that their time 
spent on the public transit system will be secure, and this requires an extensive 
effort from all responsible agencies to ensure passengers that all measures are 
being taken to facilitate smooth travel time. 
2.10 Land Use Interaction 
 There are many issues surrounding a discussion of land use interaction 
with security planning.  Many questions arise about what effect security 
considerations have upon this such as zoning and access management.  The 
current planning processes consider land use when establishing system routes 
and alignments.  When perceived through a security planning framework, that 
process of alternatives evaluation will need to be modified.  Polzin (2002) 
recently discussed this issue.  He identified implications ranging from an increase 
in employment dispersion and sprawl to a refocus on the function and importance 
of the city.  If additional security events occur in highly populated areas, some 
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shifts in migration patterns may occur as a result.  This may become more 
important as Florida is beginning to look at transportation corridor preservation.  
If security becomes one of the main criteria in evaluating and establishing these 
corridors, land use will be affected. 
2.11 Risk Assessment 
 The strategic development of transportation planning processes that 
involve security require that there must be substantial knowledge of the risks 
involved with maintaining these elements, as they are often very difficult to 
achieve without adequate financial resources.  Much of the interest in 
transportation security planning processes has emerged in large part due to post-
terrorism fears after September 11th, and there is a marked interest in 
emergency response efforts throughout all types of transportation planning 
mechanisms (Dornan and Maier 2005).  However, throughout the evaluation 
process, highly visible flaws in security have been exposed to the general public 
and to experts in the field, which have created considerable challenges in their 
efforts to overcome these gaps in knowledge and information (Dornan and Maier 
2005).  In metropolitan areas, where these processes are highly visible and 
prominent, it is especially critical to develop and implement security strategies 
that will accommodate the specific needs and calm the fears of residents that 
utilize various forms of transportation, including but not limited to the subway and 
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bus lines (Dornan and Maier 2005).  However, it is just as important to 
understand that security efforts are limited by the ability to secure funding for 
such projects at the local, state and federal levels, and that if these resources are 
scarce or are lacking altogether, little if any progress is anticipated in ensuring 
that transportation users feel more secure in their travels (Dornan and Maier 
2005). 
 It is important to recognize the varying degrees of risk that are involved in 
threats to transportation systems, and this often requires an extensive 
examination of risk levels, as noted in Table 2-3 (Boyd and Sullivan 2000).  Upon 
review and evaluation of the appropriate levels of risk involved in a given transit 
system, it is critical that the corresponding emergency preparedness strategy is 
also established in order to provide the best possible short- and long-term 
outcomes (Boyd and Sullivan 2000).  According to the authors,  
“In general, emergency plans used in the transit environment 
provide guidance for reporting and evaluating the incident, using 
the incident command system, notifying emergency response 
personnel/agencies, protecting personnel and equipment at the 
incident site, dispatching emergency response personnel and 
equipment to the site, evacuating passengers, providing briefings 
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and information updates, managing the emergency, and restoring 
the system to normal” (Boyd and Sullivan 2000) 
Table 2-3 
Transit Risk Levels 
Risk Level Definition 
1 Facilities whose loss or damage would have a major 
financial impact or result in the extended interruption of 
critical services. 
2 Facilities containing items of physical value, confidential 
information, or computer access to sensitive 
data/operational processing networks. 
3 Facilities whose disruption would be moderately serious. 
4 Facilities relatively unimportant to operations 
5 Criticality cannot be assessed 
 Risk considerations are often mitigated through improving design 
practices.  This is somewhat of a self-policing process which involves 
modifications to current practices once a risk threshold has been crossed.  In the 
planning process, risk must be estimated for at least two reasons:  (1) to 
determine what additional costs may be associated with a project due to 
increased risk that requires additional considerations, or (2) to determine if a 
potential project is considered feasible due to properly considering security risks.  
It may be necessary and beneficial to adapt and transfer current practices in 
other industries to the transportation planning arena.  This would most likely 
greatly reduce the “learning curve” and allow more rapid application of these 
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assessment methods to transportation planning by taking advantage of the 
lessons learned in other areas. 
2.12 Public Participation 
 One of the major initiatives over the past 10 years has been to provide 
and encourage the public to be more involved in the transportation planning 
process.  These initiatives have occurred nationwide.  These practices will 
present a problem when security considerations are factored into the planning 
and decision-making processes.  These processes will lose some of their 
transparency and the public may feel cheated out of their right to know when in 
fact the information may simply be classified.  It is most probably not reasonable 
to expect the public to accept a decision without knowing all of the factors that 
went into that decision.  Guidelines should be developed to assist those agencies 
presenting alternatives to the public with explanations without security 
compromises. 
 Depending upon the metropolitan location under consideration, there 
might be varying degrees of interest in security, as the need to develop strategies 
for natural disasters may be more important than the needs involving threats of 
terrorism, with examples including hurricanes and earthquakes (Dornan and 
Maier 2005).  Since the proposed study is primarily concerned with transportation 
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security planning processes for the State of Florida, it is not surprising that the 
marked threat of hurricanes during peak season is considered to be an 
overwhelming challenge to most residents.  In 2005, one of the most active 
hurricane seasons in history emerged and led to considerable threats to the 
livelihood  of many residents of Florida, and therefore, it should be noted that 
many challenges involving transportation, security and the overall well being of 
residents were identified and compromised as a direct result these disasters.  
Therefore, the emergency preparedness of Floridians for such events continues 
to be of great concern for all residents.  However, this is not the only issue that is 
cause for alarm, as threats of terrorism, although not clearly obvious in Florida, 
nonetheless continue to create apprehension for residents throughout the state.  
Florida residents want to know what plans are in place to protect them from both 
natural and man-made disasters. 
2.13 Information Availability 
 In Florida many transportation planning studies involve data that is 
considered the “best available.”  This limit is imposed by both the cost of 
collecting additional data or the time constraints associated with the project.  
Transportation planners need some guidance on how to properly consider 
transportation security when the information available is not the “best” or is 
simply not “available” because of security concerns.  It is important for 
54 
 
transportation planners to know what assumptions or “rules of thumb” are most 
accurate, even without having all of the relevant data.   
 Although there has been much interest over the years in how to effectively 
prepare for safety in transportation planning, security measures have long been 
ignored, perhaps due in large part to a lack of knowledge and available 
resources for such projects (Dornan and Maier 2005).  However, it should be 
duly noted that security and safety are not considered as the same, and that they 
should be evaluated and managed with different strategies in mind, as noted in 
the following: “Safety initiatives often have no bearing on the security of 
transportation facilities or services, and security initiatives may not impact the 
safety of transportation facilities or services” (Dornan and Maier 2005).  
Therefore, this study was not used as a means of grouping these concepts 
together, because their primary objectives and strategies should remain unique 
and distinct from one another throughout all planning processes. 
2.14 Planning Levels:  Federal, State, Local 
 Current planning practices allow control of key transportation decisions at 
different levels.  Some decisions are made at the federal level whereas others 
are made at the state or local level.  For example, the Florida Department of 
Transportation controls the flow of federal roadway and bridge dollars but the 
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local Metropolitan Planning Organizations or County Commissions assign project 
priorities.  The local governments control which projects go to the top of the 
priority list.  There should be a clear definition of who is responsible for 
addressing security issues during transportation planning.  There should also be 
clarification of who else needs to evaluate those issues.  For example, should a 
federally-controlled project be subject to local government scrutiny or visa versa.   
 In 1997, a study was conducted by Jenkins as a means of identifying the 
challenges of developing strategies in response to threats of terrorism across 
transportation channels.  There are a number of key considerations that must be 
identified, implemented and evaluated with respect to terrorist threats, and there 
must be effective measures in place in the transportation planning process in 
response to these needs (Jenkins 1997).  According to the author, “The general 
framework of preparedness progresses from planning and mitigation measures 
through response and recovery. The pre-incident mitigation steps incorporate, at 
a minimum, security and detection devices, environmental design, training, and 
outreach activities. The preparedness step focuses on the institutional capacity 
and capability of both internal and external emergency-response organizations 
and teams” (Jenkins 1997).  This statement demonstrates that there must be a 
concentrated effort from a team of individuals that are focused on the same 
objectives in order to promote the best possible outcomes for transportation 
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planning processes, and that if emergency incidents occur, there will be a 
learning curve that is designed to encourage new types of response methods to 
promote improved outcomes (Jenkins 1997). 
 It is important to recognize that terrorist threats have increased in scope 
and incidence over the past quarter-century, and consequently, transportation 
systems continue to require additional security measures to be prepared for such 
events (Jenkins 1997).  One of the key objectives of any terrorist threat or attack 
is to incite fear in mass numbers of transportation users, and therefore, it is not 
surprising that terrorists utilize these systems as a means of facilitating 
widespread panic and uproar (Jenkins 1997).  It should also be known that such 
attacks are planned over a long period of time in order to maximize the potential 
for the greatest possible level of damage and destruction, which signifies the 
intelligence and research that is performed in deciding the location and extent of 
terrorist attacks on existing transportation systems (Jenkins 1997). Table 2-4 
provides a historical perspective regarding terrorist targets over the past few 
decades, and it demonstrates that there is a widespread mix of attack targets 
that terrorists utilize in order to satisfy their desired objectives to create fear, 
panic and destruction within a given location (Jenkins 1997).  It is not surprising 
that bombings are the most common strategy that is used by terrorists, 
responsible for approximately 61 percent of all attacks for the period under 
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consideration (Jenkins 1997).  According the author, public transportation serves 
as a notable and relatively easy target, as noted in the following statement: 
“These events clearly indicate that contemporary terrorists have 
made public transportation a new theater of operations. For those 
determined to kill in quantity and willing to kill indiscriminately, 
public transportation offers an ideal target. It is public, used by 
millions of people daily. There is necessarily little security with no 
obvious chokepoints (like those at airports) to inspect passengers 
and parcels. The passengers are strangers promising attackers 
anonymity and easy escape. Concentrations of people in contained 
environments are especially vulnerable to conventional explosives 
and unconventional weapons. Also, attacks on public 
transportation, the circulatory systems of urban environments, 
cause great disruption and alarm which are the traditional goals of 
terrorism” (Jenkins 1997). 
 This statement is not surprising, considering the importance of terrorism in 
modern society as a primary means of generating fear and panic in a given group 
of unsuspecting individuals; in other words, acts of terrorism via public 
transportation allow terrorists to advance their cause and to spread the word in a 
significant way (Jenkins 1997).  Therefore, field experts and government officials 
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must be effectively prepared to manage such attacks on their systems without 
creating additional panic or harm whenever possible (Jenkins 1997). 
Table 2-4 
Location Of Attacks On Public Transportation Systems 
Location Percentage (%) 
Buses 29 
Subways and Trains 27 
Subway and Train Stations 13 
Rails 8 
Bus Terminals 7 
Tourist Buses 7 
Bridges 6 
Other 2 
School Buses 1 
Tunnels 0 (2 Incidents) 
 In developing an effective security strategy for transportation systems, it is 
critical to reexamine current priorities and involved parties to determine if any 
new stakeholders or key players must be considered in the planning process 
(Dornan and Maier 2005).  For example, it is necessary to include local 
emergency response teams, as well as national teams, such as FEMA and the 
FBI in such processes, since these teams may possess additional knowledge 
and skills that will facilitate a greater response to these challenges (Dornan and 
Maier 2005).  A greater level of oversight and guidance from national response 
teams is absolutely critical in developing an effective response strategy, as these 
teams are much more knowledgeable of the requirements and cost of enhanced 
security measures in the desired location (Dornan and Maier 2005).  
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Furthermore, these teams often provide manpower and other resources that are 
not readily available at the local level due to limited financial resources or other 
limiting constraints (Dornan and Maier 2005).  Regardless of the type of system 
under consideration, it is anticipated that extensive knowledge and resources 
from federal agencies is required in order to develop effective long-range security 
strategies (Dornan and Maier 2005). 
2.15 Organizational Structure 
 Most governments seem to be using existing departments and staff to 
handle security considerations by simply adding those responsibilities to the 
primary duties of those staff.  In most instances, the designated staffs are those 
associated with law enforcement or emergency response.  However, few to none 
of these people have the training or experience to evaluate transportation 
alternatives based on security considerations.  Ideally, there should be people 
who are uniquely qualified to deal with the planning implications of security and 
these duties should be their primary responsibility.   
 It is very important to identify the key roles and responsibilities of all 
federal, state and local agencies that are involved in developing effective 
transportation security planning strategies.  The following key objectives must be 
satisfied in any unified transportation strategy: 
60 
 
? Developing a single response to any incidents that might occur so that all 
resources are utilized wisely; 
? All goals are satisfied in a cohesive manner; 
? Information is gathered and shared so that all agencies are provided with the 
data that is necessary to conduct an effective response; 
? All agencies are well aware of their limitations in these processes; and 
? All possible efforts that would lead to duplication are eliminated whenever 
possible (Boyd and Sullivan 2000).   
 Although these objectives appear to be relatively simple, they are in fact 
very difficult to accomplish if all supporting agencies do not take their 
responsibilities seriously and without consideration of the roles of other teams in 
these processes, since these actions could be detrimental to the overall integrity 
of the chosen strategy and the potential outcomes for managing the disaster 
without dire or long-term consequences (Boyd and Sullivan 2000). 
2.16 Legal Considerations 
 There are many legal issues involved in transportation planning with 
regards to security issues.  A security event usually results in a loss of property 
or life.  Those affected will seek resolution concerning the level of preventative 
efforts taken.  Current practices do very little to address these liability concerns.  
61 
 
Actual cases will go a long way in determining the parameters concerning 
adequate levels of consideration.  However, there are secondary issues that 
must be addressed, including the inadvertent identification of critical assets 
through consideration during the transportation planning processes. 
 Recent legislation, Senate Bill 1138, in the State of Florida has allowed 
Construction Engineering & Inspection Consultants (CEI) to be considered 
agents of the state.  This was done to protect CEI companies from lawsuits that 
put an undue strain on the cost of doing business in Florida.  Contractors are 
already protected as agents of the state.  However, people will seek deep 
pockets.  In should be expected that lawyers representing citizens who are 
seeking compensation for an injury would essentially work their way upstream in 
the process.  Figure 2-1 shows the typical project process consists of planning, 
design, asset acquisition, construction, and Operations & Maintenance.  The 
process starts at time equal zero with the Planning Phase and progresses along 
the timeline as shown.  If construction contractors and management companies 
are agents of the state then the next phase upstream would involve the project 
designers.  Next to these people are the planners.   
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Figure 2-1 
Typical Project Process 
Planning Design Asset
Acquisition
Construction Operation &Maintenance
Time (Years)
0 2 4 6 8 Inf
Level
Of Effort
 
Guidelines should be developed that contain recommendations on how and 
when to protect planners who are making decisions that consider security, 
especially when those projects involve design, right-of-way acquisition, or 
construction that may be contrary to the traditional processes.   
2.17 Facility Design 
 The focus of this study did not involve reinventing the ways in which 
transportation design is done.  Transportation design, whether it be roadways or 
railways is an established science with proven methodologies.  The study 
focused on sensitizing designers to potential safety and security issues that 
result from challenges to security.  This exposure may generate different 
combinations or permutations of design elements in response to these 
challenges.  It may also involve the usage of additional design elements whose 
sole use is to protect the users of the facility or adjacent interests.  These 
additional elements will impact the project’s budget.   
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Chapter 3 
Framework For Security Planning 
 In order to better understand the project development process in Florida, it 
is important to understand the legislative background that mandates the process 
and the major stakeholders that have a role in transportation security.  
Historically, aspects of the transportation planning process were addressed 
separately in different legislation and regulations (Figure 3-1) and have 
traditionally only addressed safety.   
 More importantly, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the 
current and past two highway acts have done the most to shape the current state 
of project development.  They are particularly important because the PD&E 
process is the manifestation of NEPA in Florida.  Other key legislation includes 
the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA), 
Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21), and Safe, Accountable, 
Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act:  A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU). 
A more detailed discussion of these key pieces of legislation is included in 
Appendix E.  
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Figure 3-1 
Safety Legislation/Regulations 
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1934 
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1944 
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962 
Highway and Motor Vehicle Safety Acts of 1966 
Department of Transportation Act of 1966 
The National Highway Safety Act of 1966 
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968 
Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968 
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970 
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973 
Highway Safety Act of 1973 
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1976 
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1981 
The Highway Safety Improvement Program (HSIP) (1982) 
23 United States Code 134 - Metropolitan Planning 
23 United Stated Code 135 - Statewide Planning 
 There are a large number of agencies involved in the transportation 
planning process.  Each of these organizations has their own versions of plans 
and goals related to their transportation networks.  All of these organizations are 
moving towards improving the overall efficiency and security of their networks.  
However the different methodologies and organizational structures can be 
counterproductive to the overall emphasis on transportation security planning.  A 
detailed description of roles, responsibilities, and objectives are included in 
Appendix F.  The key players are shown in Figure 3-2. 
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Figure 3-2 
Key Transportation Planning Agencies 
Transportation Planning Agencies
Transportation Research 
Board (TRB)
Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS)
Council on Environmental 
Quality (CEQ)
National Transportation 
Safety Board (NTSB)
Private Organizations
United States Department of 
Transportation (USDOT)
•Office of the Secretary (OST)
•Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
•Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)
•Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA)
•Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)
•Federal Transit Administration (FTA)
•Maritime Administration (MARAD)
•National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
•Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)
•Research and Innovative Technology Administration (RITA)
•Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation (SLSDC)
•Surface Transportation Board (STB)
•Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
•Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
•Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
•American Public Transportation Associations (APTA)
•American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO)
•Institute of Transportation Engineers (ITE)  
3.1 Florida’s Existing Project Development Processes 
 Florida approved Procedure Number 650-000-001 on November 21, 1991 
which established the use of the Project Development & Environment (PD&E) 
Manual to be used for the project development process.  The PD&E Manual must 
be used any time the FDOT is involved, in any way, with the preparation of an 
environmental document in compliance with the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA) of 1969.  The authority to use the PD&E Manual as the basis of 
process comes from an informal agreement between the FDOT and the Federal 
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Highway Administration (FHWA) (2003).  The Central Environmental 
Management Office has responsibility for development of the manual and 
subsequent updates.  The procedures as documented in this manual serve to 
meet the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and 
other federal and state laws.  The PD&E manual requires a multi-disciplined 
approach to project development.  The Florida Department of Transportation 
works closely with the local governments and the Metropolitan Planning 
Organization (MPO) as they develop their Long Range Transportation Plan 
(LRTP). The LRTP determines the transportation improvements required over 
the next 20 to 25 years. The MPO's also develop a Transportation Improvement 
Program (TIP) which identifies and prioritizes transportation projects to be 
implemented within a 10 year period based on the LRTP.  Once the priorities are 
identified in the TIP, they are programmed in the FDOT's 5 Year Work Program. 
Once a project is programmed, the Project Development & Environment (PD&E) 
Study phase can begin.    
 The PD&E Study phase for planned transportation projects provides the 
interface between the Planning and Design phases to evaluate and document 
solutions to transportation needs that are compatible with the environment. The 
PD&E study determines if there is an engineering and environmentally feasible 
alternative to meet the need determined in the Planning phase. This process is 
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mandated by the NEPA and State law. It represents a combined effort by 
technical professionals who analyze information and document the best 
alternative to meet transportation needs.  
 The PD&E process is well documented in the PD&E Manual (FDOT 
1997).  In order to understand how and where security considerations should be 
integrated, it is necessary to explain this process in some detail, especially those 
steps or phases where changes are recommended.  Processes addressed in this 
chapter will only focus on those elements of the process that require 
transportation security considerations. 
 The steps in the process can be grouped into the Initialization, Data 
Collection, Analysis, Finalization, and Informational Phases (Figure 3-3).   It is 
also important to note that, during all of the Phases, Public Involvement activities 
occur and are extremely important to educate and inform the public of programs, 
projects, and strategies. 
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Figure 3-3 
Florida’s Existing Project Development Process 
Need
Advance
Notification
Existing
Conditions
Class Of
Action
Alternatives
Development
Social
Impacts
Alternatives
Screening
Public
Workshop
Public
Hearing
Documentation
Publication
Select Preferred
Alternative
Engineering
Impacts
Environmental
Impacts
Initialization
Phase
Data
Collection
Phase
Analysis
Phase
Finalization
Phase
Informational
Phase  
69 
 
3.1.1 Existing Initialization Phase 
 The Initialization Phase includes the recognition of a transportation need 
and adherence to the Advance Notification (AN) Process.   The first step is to 
determine project need which requires proof that a proposed alternative is 
consistent with local planning efforts.  The PD&E Manual, Part 2, Chapter 5 
requires that all proposed projects be consistent with local transportation and 
comprehensive planning, land use planning and growth management efforts.  
The local planning efforts must be updated to reflect the necessary short-term 
and long-term security needs for their regions.  Otherwise, proposed alternatives 
involving security considerations cannot be consistent with local planning efforts. 
 The AN Process is the process in which Federal, State, Local agencies 
and other stakeholders are informed of a proposed project by the FDOT.  It 
serves to notify those same agencies that the FDOT intends to seek federal 
funding for the project.  It, due to geographic location, will trigger other federal or 
state processes such as the Florida Coastal Zone Management Program 
(FCMP).  The AN process is required by the Presidential Executive Order 12372 
and the Florida Governor’s Executive Order 95-359.  Transportation projects 
must be evaluated to determine if the AN process applies.  The process for 
screening project for AN applicability is shown in Figure 3-4.  
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Figure 3-4 
Decision Process for AN Process Applicability 
Needs determination
Project on new location?
Change in functional 
characteristics or significant 
change in access?
Significant impact on social, 
cultural, or natural 
environment?
Construction or 
Reconstruction of waterway 
or significant wetland?
Non-Federally funded project 
requiring SEIR?
Involve controversy, 
substantial environmental 
alteration or community 
impacts?
Modernization requiring no additional 
right of way on existing highways by 
resurfacing, minor right-of-way 
acquisition, widening less than a single 
lane width, adding shoulders, 
landscaping, rest areas in a non-
urbanized area, adding auxiliary lanes 
for localized purposes, increasing 
superelevations, skid hazard 
resurfacing, restoration and 
rehabilitation, median development, 
bridge widening (unless permits are 
required), additional bridge deck 
pavement layers? 
Lighting, signing, pavement markings, 
signalization, freeway surveillance and 
control systems, railroad protective 
devices, break-away posts, progressive 
signal systems, pedestrian safety 
improvements?
Safety projects, and others such as 
grooving, glare screen, safety barriers, 
guardrails, energy attenuators, removal 
of signs, removal of roadside obstacles, 
removal of trees, addition of fog 
devices, and correction of road safety 
hazards?
Reconstruction of existing crossroad or 
railroad separations, railway/highway 
crossings, minor improvement or 
replacement of existing drainage 
structures, minor alterations or 
extensions of existing highway?
Non-Major State Actions?
Project MUST follow AN 
Process
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Project is EXEMPT 
from AN Process
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
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 The AN process is facilitated through the use of the AN Fact Sheet (Figure 
3-5).  This form is completed for the initial dissemination of the AN.  
Figure 3-5 
Advance Notification Fact Sheet 
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 Another possible element of the initial efforts can include the decision to 
implement the Local Agency Program (LAP) process.  The FDOT can contract 
with other governmental agencies for transportation services provided to the 
traveling public.  Local governments must be LAP certified before entering into 
this process.  This program includes the involvement of the FHWA in the 
contractual relationships between the Department and Local Agencies.  The use 
of LAP has dramatically increased over the past few years as the FDOT 
struggles with inadequate resources and funding to accomplish its planning 
efforts using their own staff and consultants.  As the use of the LAP increases, 
there is a dependency, from the FDOT, on city or county staff to provide all of the 
required expertise necessary to satisfactorily conduct a PD&E study.   
 It is also important to consider privately funded projects during initial 
coordination with other agencies.  In Florida, more agencies are looking to 
Public-Private-Partnerships as a means to accelerate project construction and to 
aid with funding delays or deficits.  Currently, privately funded projects use their 
own processes to document compliance with NEPA.  However, in many 
instances, there may be a high likelihood of transference of ownership of a 
certain facility. 
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3.1.2 Existing Data Collection Phase 
 The Data Collection Phase includes collection of all existing data or 
procurement of new data that will be required to accurately assess alternatives.  
This phase also includes the Class of Action (COA) determination once enough 
data is collected to assess significance of issues associated with the 
improvement.   
 The NEPA established that the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), the 
Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) and the Categorical Exclusion (CATEX) 
would serve as the administrative record of compliance with its policies and 
procedures for federally funded project.  It further determined that the State 
Environmental Impact Report (SEIR) and the Non-Major State Action (NMSA) 
would serve as the record of compliance for non-federally funded projects.  The 
decision as to which level of documentation is appropriate is made by the FDOT 
in consultation with the FHWA.  The EIS is the appropriate level of 
documentation for actions that “significantly” affect the human environment.  The 
normal types of projects that fall into this category are a new controlled-access 
freeway, a highway project of four or more lanes on a new location, new 
construction or extension of fixed rail transit facilities, and new construction or 
extension of a separate roadway for buses or high occupancy vehicles.  An EA is 
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prepared for projects in which the environmental impact is not known.  The EA is 
prepared in order to determine what level of document is required.   
 The administration of NEPA is typically done by the Federal Highway 
Administration or, in some cases, by other federal transportation agencies such 
as the FRA, the FAA, or the FTA.  The lead state agency is typically the FDOT.  
It can be a specific county or city given the proper delegation of administrative 
authority by the FDOT.  This can be accomplished through the LAP.  
 The determination of class of action begins with a review of the responses 
received during the AN process.  After evaluation of the comments received, the 
FHWA is consulted and the COA is determined.  In some cases, the COA 
determination may be delayed until later in the project development process in 
order to collect more data and better determine impacts associated with a project 
as alternatives are developed.  The primary documentation of the COA 
determination is the Environmental Class of Action Determination form.  Potential 
impacts of a particular project are used as the qualitative metric in order to 
determine the COA.  Page 3 of the form (Figure 3-6) lists the considerations 
when evaluating a project.   
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Figure 3-6 
Class of Action Form – Page 3 
 
 These factors are qualitatively evaluated as being Significant, Minimal, 
None, or No Involvement.  They are defined in Table 3-1. 
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Table 3-1 
COA Impact Factors 
Term Definition 
Significant The perceived impact is significant in the sense of the use of the term by CEQ regulations. 
Minimal 
The project involves an environmental issue and has a 
perceived impact, which may range in level of magnitude 
varying from minor to substantial. 
None The project has been evaluated for an environmental issue;  the issue exists but there is little or no impact 
No Involvement The environmental issue in question is not a part of or in anyway involved with the project. 
 Based upon the evaluation of these individual criteria, a COA 
determination is made. 
3.1.3 Existing Analysis Phase 
 The Analysis Phase includes the development of alternatives, the analysis 
of environmental, social, and engineering impacts associated with the 
alternatives, the screening of the alternatives based upon the impacts, and public 
involvement efforts, usually in the form of a Public Workshop or Public 
Information Meeting.    
 A major element of this phase is the development of reasonable and 
feasible alternatives, which must be discussed (Figure 3-7) in the COA (CEQ 
1978).  A critical component of this phase is the documentation of which 
alternatives are reasonable and feasible and which are eliminated early in the 
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process for not meeting established criteria and all necessary background 
information and analysis used in the decision-making process.   
Figure 3-7 
COA Discussion Items 
1. Thoroughly and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives and document 
why alternatives are eliminated. 
2. Provide enough details and analysis for reviewers to completely evaluate 
individual alternatives. 
3. Include reasonable and feasible alternatives that are not within the purview of 
the lead agency. 
4. Clearly identify the preferred alternative 
5. Mitigate the preferred alternatives as necessary 
6. Include the no-build alternative 
 The alternatives discussion section generally discusses four types of 
solutions which include the no-build (no-action) alternative, the Transportation 
System Management (TSM) alternatives, the multimodal alternatives, and any 
construction alternatives.  A construction alternative must be consistent with local 
comprehensive plans.   
 An important consideration during this phase is corridor preservation.  It is 
the intent of the corridor analysis process to evaluate alternative corridors where 
deemed reasonable and feasible.  Alternative corridors are typically considered 
reasonable and feasible if the existing or currently preferred corridor would 
experience significant impacts as a result of the proposed project.  In order to 
avoid these impacts, other existing or new corridors may be considered.   
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 Considerations of a new corridor traditionally include community values 
and concerns, contamination, archaeological or historical sites, publicly owned 
lands, threatened and endangered species, and wetlands.  The corridor 
preservation procedure is defined in the FDOT PD&E Manual and consists of 
four primary steps (Figure 3-8).  
Figure 3-8 
Corridor Preservation Procedure 
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 The process begins with a component of the Florida Transportation Plan 
(FTP) that designates corridors that are necessary for future development and 
needs.  The FDOT will prepare a Corridor Designation Report (CDR) or its 
equivalent.  An approved NEPA document, a state level environmental report, or 
other approved master or modal system plan can serve as an equivalent 
document to the CDR (FDOT Topic No. 525-030-201).  The process continues 
with an environmental assessment of the proposed corridor through the Corridor 
Planning and Design Report (CPDR) or its equivalent (FDOT Topic No. 525-030-
137).  
 One of the most important steps in any PD&E study is to establish 
evaluation criteria.  There are many factors that are typically evaluated.  In 
Florida, they are standardized, as outlined in the PD&E Manual.  These criteria 
are shown in Table 3-2. 
Table 3-2 
Standard PD&E Evaluation Criteria 
Criteria Assessment 
Community Impacts Social, economic, land use, aesthetic/livability, relocation issues, and compliance with civil rights 
Air Quality Existing/future conditions and determining if the project conforms to the Clean Air Act 
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Table 3-2 (Continued) 
Standard PD&E Evaluation Criteria 
Noise Noise levels and if they meet criteria reasonable and feasible noise abatement 
Wetlands Avoidance, minimization and mitigation of short-term and long-term impacts 
Water Quality Prevention, reduction and/or elimination of pollution of ground and surface water 
Wildlife/Habitat 
Impacts 
Identification/Protection of threatened and/or endangered 
species and their habitat 
Contamination Identification and evaluation of potential contamination problems within and/or adjacent to a project 
Floodplains Avoidance, minimization and mitigation of encroachment within the floodplain 
Archaeological & 
Historical 
Significance of sites and avoidance methods for projects 
involving recreation lands/historic/archaeological features 
Section 4(f) 
Properties 
Protection and preservation of the natural beauty of the 
countryside, public parks, recreation lands, wildlife and 
waterfowl refuges, and historic sites 
Conceptual Design 
Development and evaluation of engineering design 
concepts for environmental compatibility and satisfaction 
of the transportation need 
Public Involvement Informing and involving all stakeholders about the planned project using a Public Involvement Program 
Aquatic Preserves Impacts to sovereignty submerged lands that are to be preserved 
Wild & Scenic 
Rivers 
Impacts to those water bodies designated as wild river 
areas, scenic river areas, or recreational river areas 
Outstanding Florida 
Waterways (OFW) 
Impacts to specially designated water bodies in Florida 
that have outstanding natural attributes 
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Table 3-2 (Continued) 
Standard PD&E Evaluation Criteria 
Farmlands Impact to farmlands as designated by the Natural Resource Conservation Service (NRCS) 
Scenic Highways Impacts to the natural, physical, visual and cultural qualities of transportation facilities such as highway 
Construction 
Impacts 
Impacts to the local community as a result of the actual 
construction of the transportation project 
Visual & Aesthetic 
Impacts Aesthetic effect of the proposed project on a community 
Essential Fish 
Habitat (EFH) 
Impact to fish habitat that involves anadromous and 
certain important marine species of fish 
Coastal Barrier 
Resource 
Evaluation 
Impact to designated undeveloped coastal barriers and 
their associated aquatic habitat 
Utilities & Railroads Conflicts between the transportation project and existing and future utilities, railroads, and their users 
Permits Early coordination to determine if project is permittable 
Bicycle & Pedestrian 
Impacts 
Impacts of the transportation project on different types of 
existing non-motorized transportation modes along with 
the potential impacts of future non-motorized modes 
Corridor 
Preservation 
Compliance with the FDOT’s plan for preservation of 
specific transportation corridors, which may include 
advanced right-of-way acquisition 
 One of the tools that are used to employ these evaluation criteria is called 
the Efficient Transportation Decision Making (ETDM) Process. In response to 
TEA-21 and in response to Florida’s citizens wanting faster project 
implementation, the Florida Department of Transportation has initiated the ETDM 
Process which addresses alternatives screening from the planning phase 
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through permitting.  The main tool associated with this process in an Internet-
accessible interactive database called the Environmental Screening Tool (EST).   
 Two main alternatives screening milestones occur in the process (FDOT 
ETDM Overview 2005).  These are known as the Planning Screen and the 
Programming Screen.  The Planning Screen occurs in conjunction with the cost-
feasible plans and the Programming Screen occurs before projects are 
considered for the FDOT Work Program.  The Programming Screen is the more 
detailed of the two phases and is intended to identify technical issues that must 
be addressed by project staff, agencies, and other stakeholders. 
 Another screening tool that is used is the Environmental Technical 
Advisory Team (ETAT).  The Florida Department of Transportation is divided into 
seven geographic districts.  Each of these districts has an ETAT.  The ETAT 
consists of agency representatives or anyone having statutory responsibility for 
consultation as defined by NEPA.  The ETAT’s responsibility is to interact with 
the FDOT throughout the life cycle of a project.  The ETAT does contain 
members of law enforcement and emergency response.  One of the early 
guidelines of ETDM established that each agency was responsible to ensure the 
validity of data in existing databases and to update as necessary to ensure 
accuracy.   
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 The evaluation of these alternatives usually takes the form of an 
evaluation matrix (Figure 3-9).  This matrix is a combination of quantitative 
comparisons, usually in the form of costs, and of qualitative factors, such as a 
determination of involvement or not.  
Figure 3-9 
Evaluation Matrix Criteria 
1. Construction costs 
2. Right-of-way costs 
3. Engineering costs (Design and C.E.I.) 
4. Business damages 
5. Bicycle and pedestrian facilities 
6. Traffic control 
7. Environmental impacts (noise, air, 4(f), contamination sites, trees, etc.) 
8. Socioeconomic (R/W requirements, relocations, aesthetics, traffic flow 
improvements, neighborhood and social impacts, etc.) 
9. Operational analysis 
3.1.4 Existing Finalization Phase 
 The Finalization Phase includes the selection of a Preferred Alternative, 
public involvement efforts in the form of a Public Hearing, and final 
documentation of the study in the form of an Environmental Impact Statement 
(EIS), an Environmental Assessment (EA), a Type 1 or 2 Categorical Exclusion 
(CATEX), or a Programmatic for Federally funded projects.  For non-federally 
funded projects, the documentation takes the form of a State Environmental 
Impact Report (SEIR) or a Non-Major State Action (NMSA).   
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 The alternatives development and analysis efforts are documented in the 
Preliminary Engineering Report (PER) and in the Location Hydraulics Report 
(LHR).  They can be supported by several other documents including the 
Wetlands Evaluation Report (WER), the Endangered Species Biological 
Assessment Report (ESBA), the Cultural Resource Assessment Survey (CRAS), 
the Preliminary Pond Siting Report (PSR), the Noise Report, and the 
Contamination Screening Evaluation Report (CSER).  This study will not review 
these support documents in any detail but will instead focus on the PER, which 
serves as a culmination of all of those efforts.   
 All Draft Environmental Impact Statements (DEIS) and Final 
Environmental Impact Statements (FEIS) are circulated to a determined group of 
government agencies for their review.  This is done to satisfy the “Implementing 
Procedural Provisions” of NEPA found in CEQ, Section 1502.10(i)).  The list of 
reviewers is developed by the Central Environmental Management Office 
(CEMO) in cooperation with the FHWA and the District Environmental 
Management Offices (DEMO).  This list of reviewers will change project to project 
depending on the geographical location and the specific project issues expected 
to be encountered.   The PD&E Manual lists the agencies that must be 
considered when developing the reviewer list.  The agencies are shown in Table 
3-3. 
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Table 3-3 
Suggested DEIS And FEIS Reviewers 
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation - Office of Cultural Resources 
Preservation 
Appropriate local planning agencies 
Appropriate Metropolitan Planning Organization 
Appropriate Regional Planning Council 
Colorado State University - The Libraries, Documents Librarian 
Federal Aviation Administration - Airports District Office 
Federal Aviation Administration - Regional Director 
Federal Emergency Management Agency - Associate General Counsel for 
Insurance and Mitigation 
Federal Emergency Management Agency - Natural Hazards Branch, Chief 
Florida Department of Community Affairs Federal Railroad Administration - Office 
of Economic Analysis, Director 
Florida Department of Environmental Protection 
Florida Department of Health 
Florida Department of State - Division of Historical Resources 
Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission 
Police Department 
United States Army Corps of Engineers - Regulatory Branch, District Engineer 
United States Coast Guard - Commander (oan) - Seventh District 
United States Coast Guard - Commander (obr) - Eighth District 
United States Department of Agriculture - Natural Resources Conservation 
Service, State Conservationist 
United States Department of Agriculture - Southern Regional Forester 
United States Department of Commerce - National Marine Fisheries Service - 
Habitat Conservation Division 
United States Department of Commerce - National Marine Fisheries Service - 
Southeast Regional Office 
United States Department of Commerce - National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration 
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development - Regional 
Environmental Officer 
United States Department of Interior - Bureau of Indian Affairs - Office of Trust 
Responsibilities 
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Table 3-3 (Continued) 
Suggested DEIS And FEIS Reviewers 
United States Department of Interior - Bureau of Land Management - Eastern 
States Office 
United States Department of Interior - Fish and Wildlife Service, Field Supervisor 
United States Department of Interior - National Park Service - Southeast 
Regional Office 
United States Department of Interior - Office of Environmental Policy and 
Compliance, Director 
United States Department of Interior - United States Geological Survey Chief 
United States Department of State - Office of Environment, Health and Natural 
Resources 
United States Dept. of Health and Human Services - Center for Environmental 
Health and Injury Control 
United States Environmental Protection Agency - Region IV, Regional 
Administrator 
United States Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C. 
Water Management District 
3.1.5 Existing Informational Phase 
 The Informational Phase involves the dissemination of the final 
commitments and recommendations to all appropriate agencies and to the public 
and other stakeholders.  The distribution of these final elements is accomplished 
by the use of the same mailing list that is discussed in the AN process.  Other 
means of notifying the public are employed such as newspaper advertisements 
and putting the final documents on display at public libraries. 
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3.1.6 Existing Public Involvement Considerations 
 The intent of the public involvement process is to inform the public about a 
specific transportation project.  It provides opportunities for stakeholders to 
provide input into the decision-making process.  The FDOT PD&E Manual states, 
“An effective public involvement plan can foster understanding and 
cooperation between the Department and the public; help develop 
a transportation system that meets real community needs; saves 
money by reducing or eliminating the need to redesign; and prevent 
last minute blow-ups or delays because of unresolved issues.” 
 The key to the process is in its comprehensive nature.  Public involvement 
during the planning and programming phases is done to accomplish several 
things.  These include determination of priorities, identification of social/economic 
impacts associated with projects, and identification of additional needs or wants 
associated with the proposed projects. (Virginia Department of Transportation 
2004)  Public involvement during planning phases deals more with projects and 
features whereas public involvement during programming deals more with 
prioritization and funding of solutions. 
 The requirements for public involvement are derived from Federal 
requirements for transportation planning (23 U.S.C. 134(g)(4) and 23 U.S.C. 
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135(e)(3)) mandating that public involvement must employ proactive practices 
within the context of systematic processes;  Public involvement processes 
provide complete information, timely public notice, full public access to key 
decisions, and supports early and continuing involvement of the public in 
developing Statewide and metropolitan transportation plans and programs;  
public involvement involves a holistic understanding of the environment and 
community culture; and public involvement processes must be consistent with 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990. 
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Chapter 4 
Survey Results And Analysis 
 Due to the developing nature of security planning nationally and due to the 
complexity of the project development process in Florida, it was important to 
provide some relevant background regarding perceptions with respect to 
transportation security planning, both nationally and in Florida.  
 Two methods were used to establish this background.  The first was a 
letter that was mailed to transportation leaders across the nation, and the second 
was an online questionnaire that was completed by professionals and general 
public, all of whom are residents of Florida.  This chapter reports on the results of 
these two instruments. 
4.1 State Request Letter  
 The State Request Letter, shown in Appendix C, was mailed in November 
of 2003.  This letter was mailed to all 50 states, the District of Columbia and 
Puerto Rico.  The intent of this letter was to: 
? Establish a contact list of personnel currently dealing with security issues in 
each state. 
90 
 
? Determine the level of effort for each state when dealing with security issues. 
? Indicate a state in which to conduct this research based upon development in 
that state and interest level of its staff. 
? Get an initial indication of the validity of the research. 
? Get an initial indication of the utility of the research. 
4.1.1 State Request Letter Responses 
 The results (Table 4-1) are documented as No Response, Mailed 
Response, Emailed Response, or Phone Interview.  In the case of a response, 
information is provided to indicate the agencies response and any information 
provided. 
Table 4-1 
Request Letter Responses 
California Mailed Response:  Gathered and forwarded data concerning security measures/efforts currently being used.  
Connecticut 
Mailed Response:  They stated they do not "incorporate security consideration in 
its transportation planning and decision-making processes".   However, they did 
express interest in receiving the final results of this research effort. 
Florida 
Phone Interview:  They stated that they do not consider security issues during 
planning.  They recommended I speak with the emergency management agencies.  
They mentioned the possibility for ETDM screening for security.  They forwarded 
information on sea port security and guidelines for implementation of flexible airport 
funding, They mostly funded projects related to security, like fencing, camera 
systems, lighting, etc.   They are participating in conference call with other states.   
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Table 4-1 (Continued) 
Request Letter Responses 
Georgia Mailed Response:  Stated they are unwilling to participate at this time. 
Indiana 
Mailed Response:  They stated that their planning/project programming process is 
carried systematically by means of a blend of activities-some more judgment-based 
(such as reliance on our district personnel's field experience and interaction with local 
officials and the public), some more analytically based (such as continual evaluation 
of the entire state highway network using FHWA's Highway Economic Requirements 
System, or HERS program)-to arrive at a list of candidate projects.  They mentioned 
that transportation security may be an explicit factor at the project alternatives' 
assessment level (e.g., redundancy in major river crossings).  They stated that the 
DOT, as a matter of policy and standards, designs into its facilities risk-reduction 
measures for such things as floods (e.g., bridges designed to convey specific, 
infrequent flood events) and earthquakes (e.g., bridges in SW Indiana receive 
enhanced earthquake load design requirements).      
Kentucky 
Phone Interview:  They stated that they have 2 MPO's that border military bases, Ft. 
Campbell and Ft. Knox.  They work with representatives from each through their 
committees.  Airport for Ft. Campbell affected intersection because of flight line.  ITS 
branch handles part of it.  There are 15 area development districts, which are local 
planning offices.  These districts deal with Safety as part of agenda.  They have only 
had presentations about security but it is not part of their normal focus.  Unique issue 
is planning of vice presidential debate held in Danfield where they worked closely 
with security forces to assess needs including parking garages and speech needs.   
New 
Mexico 
Phone Interview:  State has formed a "security task force" to deal with security 
issues.   
New York 
Emailed Response:    They stated that they are unsure of the organizational structure 
in terms of security planning and that they were not aware of any single point of 
contact because it is being handled by several departments.  They are currently 
consolidating policy. 
Ohio 
Mailed Response:  Forwarded copy of "draft" chapter on "Transportation Security" 
from their Long Range Plan.   The information summarizes ODOT's program, 
policies, and procedures relative to security.   
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Table 4-1 (Continued) 
Request Letter Responses 
Oregon 
Mailed Response:  They forwarded information from draft guidelines that they 
were preparing concerning security operations as part of the Oregon 
Transportation Plan.  They have formed a committee structure to discuss 
security.  The committee structure includes a Steering Committee and 3 policy 
committees, one of which is entitled Safety and Security.   
Pennsylvania 
Phone Interview:  They do work in emergency response.  They are structured as 
highway department.  They have Volpe center doing a gap analysis to look at 
where they are, best practices, current guidance for transportation security.  One 
areas already touching on was confidentiality of bridge plans but haven’t started 
changing bridge plans.  They will identify critical infrastructure, do common sense 
types of things.  Nothing yet on planning & programming.  One thing to come out 
of study will be organizational structure issues.  Are amateurs going to do the 
jobs of professionals?  On highway side may involve tunnels, bridges, facilities.  
They also run DMV and there is licensing, stolen plates, etc... issues.  Motor 
carriers carrying inappropriate materials, bad routes, improper labels.  Planning & 
Programming will be focused on highway side.  How to deal with funding, 
emergency response, training, material, location beyond the normal natural 
disaster.  One issue that they deal with is nuclear generating stations that they 
have.  Who plows radioactive snow?  They have been talking to different states 
to find out what each state is doing differently, how they are organized and what 
advice can they give to Pennsylvania DOT.  They are only dealing with broad 
brush themes.  Some states have staff devoted full time looking for money.  They 
contacted only select states that are considered leaders.   
Tennessee Phone Interview:  They responded with a list of contacts concerning security response efforts.   
Washington 
Phone Interview:  They responded with a list of contacts concerning security 
response efforts.  They have developed a “Gray Note Book”, which is used as an 
accountability tool.  
Washington 
DC 
Phone Interview:  They stated that security was being discussed from 2 different 
perspectives (1) infrastructure protection and (2) emergency preparedness.  
They are discussing ITS regional architecture, partnerships, stakeholders that 
cross all disciplines, similar to hurricane arena. 
 Request letters were mailed to all 50 states, the District of Columbia and 
Puerto Rico.  Of those 52 entities, 14 responded in some fashion (Figure 4-1).  
The states that responded include California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, 
Indiana, Kentucky, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
Tennessee, Washington, and Washington, D.C. This equates to a 27% response 
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rate.  Of those responding, only Georgia declined participation or discussion of 
security planning. 
4.1.2 Request Letter Analysis 
 The first objective of the State Request Letter was to establish a list of 
personnel currently dealing with security issues in each state.  As a result of this 
effort, a contact database was generated and is contained in Appendix B.  A 
more long-term benefit of this effort is that this contact list can be used in further 
analysis of this topic area. 
 Another purpose of developing this list of planning, security, and 
emergency management personnel was to establish the level of effort that each 
state is putting forth in the area of transportation security planning.  As evidenced 
by the responses, only a very few states had initiated efforts along this path.  
Most of the states that responded were investing the majority of their efforts and 
funding towards operations and maintenance and were concerned with 
retrofitting their existing facilities.   
 Also, based upon the responses and the activity of each state with regards 
to transportation security planning, the results of this effort confirmed the 
approach of using Florida and their processes as the basis of study and analysis 
for this research effort.   
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 This request letter, through the lack of response and indication of little 
effort being expended by the states, demonstrated that this is a topic area that is 
largely unexplored nationally.  Of the 52 letters mailed, 38 states (approximately 
73%) did not respond to multiple efforts to contact them regarding the subject.  
This clearly demonstrated the validity of the research effort.  There was also a 
large interest, from those states that responded, to receive the results of this 
research effort.  All of the states that responded, except for Georgia, gave an 
initial indication that this research had utility in their states. 
Figure 4-1 
State Request Letter Response 
No Response
Participated
Did Not Participate
Legend
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4.2 Online Questionnaire 
 The online questionnaire (http://home.earthlink.net/~securityplanning/) 
was developed and administered to obtain general public perceptions about 
security concerns in Florida.  Public perception is an important consideration as 
related to the Project Development Process in Florida.  Public Involvement is 
mandated throughout the process and, as long as there are no overriding safety 
concerns involved, can greatly influence the outcome of a PD&E Study.  It is 
necessary to consider the results of the online questionnaire as a means of 
understanding the perceptions about security that Floridians possess and how 
that may affect the project development process.  There were some basic 
principles (Figure 4-2) revealed with respect to how Floridians perceive 
transportation planning in their state.     
Figure 4-2 
Online Questionnaire Observations 
Floridians will participate in security programs 
Overall sense of loss of control over security
Some advances in Security are being made
Floridians feel fairly safe
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Chapter 5 
Revised Project Development Process 
 This chapter will serve as a supplement to Florida’s PD&E Manual and will 
address how to adequately consider and incorporate transportation security into 
Florida’s PD&E process.  The Project Development Process has been modified, 
as shown in Figure 5-1, to reflect those considerations.  The following sections 
will address each of those steps, identify the “Deficiency” associated with each 
step, determine a “Security Solution” to properly deal with the deficiency, and 
then explain the “Benefit” of the solution. 
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Figure 5-1 
Revised Project Development Process 
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5.1 Revised Initialization Phase 
 The AN Process should be modified to eliminate certain exclusions 
(Figure 5-2).  
Figure 5-2 
Project Type Exclusion Modification 
Deficiency:  The exclusion of certain types projects from the AN process 
allows a project, especially a safety or signalization project, to progress 
without review from critical security agencies.  This is especially 
important when many signalization projects now involve advanced 
technologies such as ITS and complicated fiber optic networks.
Security Solution:  Safety projects, signalization projects and Non-
Major State Actions (NMSA) must comply with the Advance Notification 
(AN) process.
Benefit:  All projects will be reviewed for security concerns.  This will 
ensure coordination and communication and no projects will fall in the 
gaps. 
 
 The AN response system should be modified to provide an active 
response requirement (Figure 5-3). 
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Figure 5-3 
AN Response System Modification 
Deficiency:  The AN response system is a passive response system 
and any agency failing to respond is considered to have no concerns or 
involvement.  
Security Solution:  Implement an active response system that requires 
a written response from all agencies on the distribution list, regardless 
of involvement in the project. 
Benefit:  This will ensure review by qualified personnel.  Security 
concerns will not fall victim to lack of time or personnel.
 
 The AN Fact Sheet should be modified to add a section providing security 
comments (Figure 5-4).  The form should be modified as shown in Figure 5-5. 
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Figure 5-4 
AN Fact Sheet Modification 
Deficiency:   The AN Fact Sheet does not currently contain a specific 
section for discussion of security considerations. 
Security Solution:  Modify the AN Fact Sheet to include a section to 
indicate whether the project may involve critical infrastructure, critical 
corridors, or other potential targets of terrorist acts.
Benefit:  All agencies will know about the potential security concerns 
and allocate resources more efficiently and effectively. 
 
Figure 5-5 
Modified AN Form 
_________________________________________________
6. Security:  Does this project involve critical 
infrastructure, critical corridors, or other potential 
targets of terrorist acts?
_______Yes ________No
 
 The AN process should be modified to not require inclusion of any 
graphical exhibit that may represent sensitive security information (Figure 5-6). 
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Figure 5-6 
Graphical Exhibit Modification 
Deficiency:  The current process requires certain graphical elements to 
orient the recipient to the project and its associated issues. 
Security Solution:  Do not include graphical or detailed representation 
of any security sensitive sites, those that are deemed “Critical 
Infrastructure” by the State of Florida, in the Advance Notification (AN) 
package or any other published document. Rely on the security agency 
to review their secure databases and provide a fatal flaw analysis of the 
project.
Benefit:  This will protect sensitive information and reduce the risk of 
additional circulation of AN.
 
 The LAP Program should be modified to require ETAT review of all 
projects conducted using the program (Figure 5-7). 
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Figure 5-7 
LAP Program Modification 
Deficiency:  As the use of the LAP increases, there is a dependency, 
from the FDOT, on city or county staff to provide all of the required 
expertise necessary to satisfactorily conduct a PD&E study.  Most cities 
and counties do not have the adequately trained personnel to deal with 
security concerns on a state level. 
Security Solution:  Require all LAP participants to adhere to all of the 
security considerations discussed in this research and that their ability 
to implement these considerations is a deciding factor in their LAP 
approval.
Benefit:  This will reinforce the core process and allow a complete 
review of projects, regardless of funding sources.
 
 The private development process should be modified to require 
compliance with all FDOT requirements (Figure 5-8). 
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Figure 5-8 
Private Development Modification 
Deficiency:  In Florida, more and more agencies are looking to Public-
Private-Partnerships as a means to accelerate project construction and 
to aid with funding delays or deficits.  Currently, privately funded 
projects use their own processes to document compliance with NEPA. 
Security Solution:  Require privately funded projects to adhere to the 
same processes involving security review as those publicly funded 
projects, especially if there is any potential for transference of 
ownership of the facility to the government.  Make demonstration of 
compliance with FDOT processes mandatory before ownership can be 
transferred.
Benefit:  This will protect the FDOT from liability associated with lack of 
due diligence regarding security concerns.
 
 Local comprehensive planning efforts should reflect security planning 
elements (Figure 5-9). 
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Figure 5-9 
Local Comprehensive Planning Modification 
Deficiency:  A proposed alternative must be consistent with local 
planning efforts when establishing need.  Currently, local plans do not 
contain a security element not does it address security concerns on 
specific projects mentioned in their planning efforts. 
Security Solution:  The local planning efforts must be updated to reflect 
the necessary short-term and long-term security needs for their 
regions.  Otherwise, proposed alternatives involving security 
considerations cannot be consistent with local planning efforts.
Benefit:  This will force local governments to direct resources towards 
identification and planning of critical assets.
 
5.2 Revised Data Collection Phase 
 The COA form should be modified to reflect security impacts (Figure 
5-10).  The resulting form should include those items shown in Figure 5-11. 
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Figure 5-10 
COA Form Modification 
Deficiency:  The current COA form does not reflect any consideration of 
transportation security in its evaluation of appropriate level of effort or 
documentation in the PD&E process. 
Security Solution:  The potential risk to the proposed project from either 
a man-made or natural disaster should be included in the determination 
of the level of study required to analyze the project. A section should be 
added to the COA form, page 3, in Section 6 (“Impact Evaluation”) that 
addresses security concerns for a particular proposed project.
Benefit:  This will allow a security concern to dictate the COA of a 
particular project and thereby potentially allow a greater level of 
analysis.
 
Figure 5-11 
Modified COA Form 
F. SECURITY
1. Stand-Off Distance [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]
2. Access Restriction [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]
3. Time on Target Reduction [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]
4. Protection of Key Elements [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]
5. Role in Economy [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]
6. Replacement Cost [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]
7. Lost Time [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]
8. Visibility [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]
9. National Symbol [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]
10. National Defense [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]
11. Site Hazards [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]
12. Interdependency [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]
13. Maintenance [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]
14. Operations [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]
15. Vulnerability [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]
16. Community Impact [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]
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5.3 Revised Analysis Phase 
 The corridor analysis process should be modified to consider security 
needs (Figure 5-12).  The list of reviewers should list those shown in Table 5-1. 
 
Figure 5-12 
Corridor Analysis Modification 
Deficiency:  Security should a primary consideration when considering 
a new corridor.  Related to corridor analysis is the concept of corridor 
preservation.  The FDOT has established a procedure for preserving 
land for the future needs of infrastructure and the transportation 
systems.  As development in Florida accelerates, there is a great 
potential for development of land that, due to geographic location, is 
critical to the future needs of Florida’s transportation network.  This 
process does not currently provide for security as a viable motivation for 
corridor preservation. 
Security Solution:  Security experts should review the proposed 
corridors for potential concerns or fatal flaws.  Amend the corridor 
preservation process to allow for advanced right-of-way acquisition, or 
at least easements acquisition, to preserve the continuity of necessary 
transportation corridors from both connectivity and security 
perspectives.
Benefit:  This will ensure review by qualified personnel.  Security 
concerns will not fall victim to lack of resources.
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Table 5-1 
Recommended Security Agency Reviewers 
1. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) 
2. Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) 
3. Federal Transit Administration (FTA) 
4. Maritime Administration (MARAD) 
5. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) 
6. Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) 
7. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
8. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
9. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 
10. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Office of National Security 
Coordination 
11. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Preparedness Division 
12. Local Emergency Management Agencies 
 The ETDM tool should be modified to provide a security screening module 
(Figure 5-13). 
Figure 5-13 
ETDM Modification 
Deficiency:  The ETDM does not currently use any security based 
evaluation criteria for identification or project issues nor do any security 
qualified personnel participate in the electronic screening efforts. 
Security Solution:  A security screening module should be included in 
the program that would allow security experts to be involved in the 
process of screening alternatives.  This module should be attached to 
both the Planning and Programming Screens.
Benefit:  This would allow those security personnel assigned to the 
ETAT to review the project with regards to security and provide selection 
of the best alternative.
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 The ETAT membership should be modified to require participation of 
security experts on the committee (Figure 5-14). 
Figure 5-14 
ETAT Membership Modification 
Deficiency:  The ETAT does contain members of law enforcement and 
emergency response, but does not include anyone who is trained and 
qualified to make security assessments. 
Security Solution:  Because of the internet based review process, it 
would be simple for an expert, located anywhere in the United States, to 
review projects.  Therefore, require a representative from the same 
agencies that are added to the review phase also participate 
electronically via the internet.
Benefit:  This would ensure that a properly qualified individual is 
reviewing projects for security concerns and allow rapid update of that 
information via the internet.
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 A GIS layer should be developed to represent critical infrastructure and 
other facilities that represent security considerations (Figure 5-15). 
Figure 5-15 
GIS Layer Modification 
Deficiency:  The ETDM screening tools depend on members on the 
team to ensure accuracy of data available from their own respective 
agencies for screening alternatives.  There currently exists no data 
layer available with regards to critical infrastructure because there is no 
security representation either in ETAT or the ETDM process. 
Security Solution:  This data could consist of Geographic Information 
System (GIS) data or other data deemed relevant.  The FDOT should 
develop a security based, GIS layer that could be easily overlaid onto 
proposed projects as an initial screening tool to determine fatal flaws in 
proposed projects or alternatives.
Benefit:  This will allow ETAT members to determine fatal flaws with 
particular projects or alternatives early in the process and continuously 
throughout the process.
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 The evaluation matrix should be modified to account for security costs and 
considerations (Figure 5-16). 
Figure 5-16 
Evaluation Matrix Modification 
Deficiency:  The evaluation matrix and the minimum requirements for 
such, used to evaluate alternatives, do not consider security issues in 
the evaluation of alternatives. 
Security Solution:  Include the following factors in the evaluation matrix:  
(1) Overall cost of security provisions, which would consist of all design, 
construction, maintenance, and operations costs associated with 
recommended improvements to protect infrastructure, and (2) a 
qualitative assessment of whether a particular alternative involves a 
higher likelihood of attractiveness or vulnerability as a result of 
recommended improvements.
Benefit:  This will indicate to the public that there are security concerns 
associated with particular alternatives and allow them to see the 
impacts of those concerns on the decision making process.
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 The list of standard evaluation criteria should be modified to reflect 
security considerations (Figure 5-17).  The list should include the 16 factors listed 
in Table 5-2. 
Figure 5-17 
Evaluation Factors Modification 
Deficiency:  There are many evaluation factors that are typically 
evaluated in Florida.  They are largely standardized and are outlined in 
the PD&E Manual.  There are no evaluation criteria for security 
considerations. 
Security Solution:  Include a list of standard security evaluation criteria 
in the overall list of evaluation criteria.
Benefit:  These new criteria will provide both qualitative and quantitative 
measures that will allow a proper screening of alternatives based on 
security concerns.
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Table 5-2 
Security Evaluation Criteria 
Criteria Evaluation Costs Benefits 
Stand-Off 
Distance 
Cost associated 
with provision of 
adequate stand-off 
distance (Sufficient 
distance as 
determined by the 
most current 
criteria).   
? Acquisition of 
additional right-
of-way not 
required 
otherwise 
? Modification of 
horizontal 
alignment 
? Corridor 
preservation 
? Increased 
corridor security 
? Reduction of 
primary and 
secondary 
impacts to 
transportation 
facility and 
adjacent 
facilities 
? Reduced 
vulnerability 
Access 
Restriction 
Cost associated 
with the limitation of 
access to critical 
areas such as 
transportation 
system or adjacent 
critical 
infrastructure (i.e. 
petroleum tank 
farms, chemical 
plants)    
? Limitation of 
access 
(connecting 
facilities) 
? Improved barrier 
systems to 
prevent 
deviation from 
established 
corridors 
? Reduced 
vulnerability 
? Detection 
? Deterrence 
 
Time-on-
Target 
Cost associated 
with the reduction 
of allowable delay 
time along specific 
corridors that may 
be within the 
allowable stand-off 
distance 
? Reduction of 
facility features 
(shoulders on 
roadways) 
? Increased 
speed limits 
? Increased 
enforcement 
activity 
? Increased 
surveillance 
? Increased 
security 
? Reduced 
vulnerability 
? Deterrence 
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Table 5-2 (Continued) 
Security Evaluation Criteria 
Criteria Evaluation Costs Benefits 
Protection of 
Key Elements 
Cost of protection 
of critical 
infrastructure 
through attack on 
key elements such 
as bridge pilings. 
? Hardening costs 
? Increased 
maintenance 
costs 
? Applies to man-
made and 
natural disasters
? Reduced 
vulnerability 
 
Economic 
Role 
Impact of loss of 
the facility or of 
reduced capacity 
on the local or 
regional economy.  
This is a qualitative 
factor that can be 
assessed as Low, 
Medium, or High for 
comparative 
purposes. 
? Redundancy 
? Network 
Development 
? Applies to man-
made and 
natural disasters
? Accurate 
budgeting 
? Efficient funding 
allocation 
? Encourage 
asset hardening 
by other parties 
Replacement 
Cost 
Evaluate the 
potential cost to 
replace the 
infrastructure. 
? Value 
assessments 
? Updates to 
assessments 
? Applies to man-
made and 
natural disasters
Lost Time Cost associated 
with increased 
travel time or other 
delays caused by 
the loss of the 
facility. 
? Travel time 
studies 
? Redundancy 
? Applies to man-
made and 
natural disasters
? Network 
flexibility 
? Multi-use 
capability 
Visibility Costs associated 
with economic 
losses, caused by a 
loss of a facility, 
associated with 
public perception.  
? Value 
assessments 
? Identification of 
public concerns 
? Monitoring of 
public opinion 
? Applies to man-
made and 
natural disasters
? Accurate 
budgeting 
? Efficient funding 
allocation 
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Table 5-2 (Continued) 
Security Evaluation Criteria 
Criteria Evaluation Costs Benefits 
National 
Symbol 
Impact associated 
with the loss of a 
facility deemed a 
national symbol.  
This is a qualitative 
factor that can be 
assessed as Low, 
Medium, or High for 
comparative 
purposes.  Any 
alternative ranking 
Medium or High 
should not be 
considered 
feasible. 
? Access 
restrictions 
? Route circuity 
? Hardening 
? Shielding 
? National morale 
? Encourage 
asset hardening 
by other parties 
National 
Defense 
Importance of the 
facility to national 
defense, primarily 
related to 
transportation of 
needed resources.  
Facilities that are 
on Strategic 
Highway Network 
(STRAHNET). This 
is a qualitative 
factor that can be 
assessed as Low, 
Medium, or High for 
comparative 
purposes.   
? Priority 
treatment 
? Design 
restrictions 
? Higher 
standards 
? Protects 
STRAHNET 
? Allows 
increased 
response 
efficiency 
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Table 5-2 (Continued) 
Security Evaluation Criteria 
Criteria Evaluation Costs Benefits 
Site Hazards Impacts associated 
with the specific 
site conditions.  
This may include 
increased 
secondary 
damages resulting 
from on-site 
storage of 
hazardous 
materials.  This is a 
qualitative factor 
that can be 
assessed as Low, 
Medium, or High for 
comparative 
purposes.  The 
ranges for each 
category will be 
determined by the 
types of hazards 
present. 
? Database of site 
conditions 
? Update site 
conditions 
database 
 
? Applies to man-
made and 
natural disasters
? Encourage 
asset hardening 
by other parties 
Inter- 
dependency 
Costs associated 
with reduction of 
service of other 
elements of the 
infrastructure as a 
result of the loss of 
this facility. 
? Communication 
equipment 
compatibility 
? Redundancy 
? Increased 
coordination 
? Study 
requirements 
beyond the 
immediate 
project area 
? Applies to man-
made and 
natural disasters
? Improvements 
to alternative 
modes 
? Encourages 
multi-modal 
consideration to 
meet needs 
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Table 5-2 (Continued) 
Security Evaluation Criteria 
Criteria Evaluation Costs Benefits 
Maintenance Costs associated 
with additional 
maintenance of 
protective 
measures. 
? Increased 
maintenance 
costs over the 
life of the 
infrastructure 
? Accurate 
budgeting 
? Efficient funding 
allocation 
Operations Costs associated 
with additional 
operations of 
protective 
measures.  
? Infrastructure 
? Human 
resources 
? Equipment 
? Training 
? Accurate 
budgeting and 
allocation 
? Effective 
communication 
? Increase 
responsiveness 
? Applies to man-
made and 
natural disasters
Vulnerability Impact associated 
with a change in 
vulnerability of an 
asset as a result of 
the developed 
alternatives.  This is 
a qualitative factor 
that can be 
assessed as Low, 
Medium, or High for 
comparative 
purposes.  
? Assessment 
? Resolution 
? Tracking 
? Decrease 
vulnerability 
? Encourage 
asset hardening 
by other parties. 
Community 
Impact 
Impact to 
community function 
and integrity.  This 
is a qualitative 
factor that can be 
assessed as Low, 
Medium, or High for 
comparative 
purposes.   
? Hazards 
Analysis 
? Monitoring of 
public concerns 
? Public 
acceptance of 
project 
? Ability to 
accurately 
access impacts 
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5.4 Revised Finalization Phase 
 The distribution of the environmental documentation for review should be 
modified to include certain agencies (Figure 5-18).  The agencies that should be 
included are shown in Table 5-1. 
Figure 5-18 
Environmental Document Review Modification 
Deficiency:  All Draft Environmental Impact Statements (DEIS) and 
Final Environmental Impact Statements (FEIS) are circulated to a 
determined group of government agencies for their review.  These 
agencies address the historical aspects of transportation planning but 
do not adequately provide input from those agencies concerned with 
transportation security. 
Security Solution:  Security experts from several agencies should be 
involved in the review of these significant projects. 
Benefit: This will ensure review by qualified personnel.  Security 
concerns will not fall victim to lack of resources.
 
 A security document should be developed to adequately document the 
decision making process as related to transportation security (Figure 5-19). 
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Figure 5-19 
Security Documentation Modification 
Deficiency:  There is no mechanism, document, or report that is 
currently produced to chronicle the decisions that were made on 
alternatives development, analysis, and selection with regards to 
transportation security.  This cannot be accomplished in the traditionally 
published documents such as the PER or the environmental document 
due to the sensitive nature of the information. 
Security Solution:  Develop a technical memorandum or report entitled 
“Security Assessment Report” (SAR) to fully document the decision-
making process for security based decisions.  This information would 
then become a controlled informational items treated similarly to bridge 
reports.
Benefit:  This will document decision making process related to security 
concerns and allow reproduction of those decisions at a later date.
 
5.5 Revised Informational Phase 
 Security experts should receive final distribution of the final environmental 
and security documentation (Figure 5-20).  The distribution list should include 
those listed in Table 5-1. 
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Figure 5-20 
Final Distribution Modification 
Deficiency:  The final version of the Environmental Document is sent to 
reviewing agencies for their files and for incorporation into their 
planning efforts.  However, security experts from several agencies are 
not currently on the distribution list. 
Security Solution:  Security experts from several agencies should be 
involved in the distribution list for the final environmental documents. 
Benefit: This will ensure review by qualified personnel.  Security 
concerns will not fall victim to lack of resources.
 
5.6 Revised Public Involvement Considerations 
 Revisions to the Public Involvement Process should be made that would 
allow adequate response by the public (Figure 5-21). 
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Figure 5-21 
Public Involvement Modification 
Deficiency:  With the widespread diversity of the Florida population, 
there is a strong interest in accommodating the needs of both the 
Spanish and English-speaking populations in the state. Therefore, all 
transportation initiatives must consider the influence of these 
population characteristics prior to implementation of any new 
processes or strategies that are likely to impact the population as a 
whole.  Most importantly, transportation planners must involve the 
general public in some aspects of the development process as a means 
of identifying new areas of influence and the overall direction of 
transportation throughout the state. 
Security Solution:  Security measures that lead to implementation must 
evolve slowly, taking the population and their needs into consideration, 
such as language barriers and tourist limitations.  Therefore, security 
enhancements must be well publicized throughout all transportation 
channels as a means of promoting these changes in all areas of the 
state.  Transportation users must experience a sense of confidence and 
support for these initiatives, and if they are introduced gradually to the 
general public, their impact will be even greater and more widespread.  
Benefit:  Will allow solutions that meet the needs of a multi-cultural state 
where growth and tourism can dramatically change the face public 
opinion over a short period of time.
 
 An education program should be developed to train project personnel on 
process for security information dissemination (Figure 5-22). 
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Figure 5-22 
Information Dissemination Modification 
Deficiency:  The challenge with regards to transportation security is in 
the discussion of how much and what kind of information can be 
revealed to the public in order to convince them that the best, most 
secure, alternative is being chosen.  This has to be done without 
violating any federal or state laws with regards to secure information 
dissemination. 
Security Solution:  Efforts should be made during the implementation of 
the entire public involvement phase to screen information for 
appropriateness.  In order to educate staff, training should be 
conducted that will inform them of the appropriate types of information 
that can be given to the public.  Also, all information should be reviewed 
by appropriate security personnel prior to being released to the public or 
media.  This should occur at project milestones which may include the 
community awareness memorandum, a public information meeting, a 
project website, a project newsletter, or a public hearing.
Benefit:  This will increase information security and standardize, 
through education and process, information dissemination.
 
 
 The modified PD&E process described in this chapter will enable 
practitioners to adequately consider security in the project development process.  
The cost of implementation will be minimal.  These changes can be 
accomplished in a short time frame without jeopardizing the existing methods 
and results. 
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Chapter 6 
Findings And Next Steps 
6.1 Key Findings 
 Based upon this research effort, there are three (3) key findings.  The 
most critical findings include the criteria to evaluate a project based upon 
security, the necessity for adequate participation by other federal agencies, and 
the consideration of public opinion and input into the modified process.  These 
findings were based upon exhaustive efforts to determine the most critical needs 
and opportunities that lie in the existing process, thereby enabling realistic 
integration of security considerations with minimal change to the existing 
organizational culture.  After completion of this research effort, a vetting phase 
ensued wherein the reasonableness and effectiveness of the modified process 
was discussed with transportation practitioners in Florida.  Based upon 
conversations with leading transportation officials with the FDOT and private 
security consultants, there is a distinct need for security considerations in the 
development process and it is expected that there will be great interest in 
implementation of the modified process.  The inoculation of security into the 
project development process will take time to mature and take on a stable form in 
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the long term process, but this research effort, based upon post-research 
interviews, seems to be a necessary step in accomplishing those goals. 
6.1.1 Security Evaluation Criteria 
 This research effort has resulted in a project security evaluation toolbox 
that can be immediately applied to Florida’s project development process with 
minimal efforts.  The sixteen (16) evaluation criteria will allow project participants 
to practically evaluate the reasonableness and feasibility of projects within a 
security framework.  They will provide a means to accurately estimate potential 
impacts, both social and economic, associated with both man-made and natural 
disasters.  These assessments will allow accurate budgeting and efficient 
allocation of resources.  These new criteria will sensitize planners to the security 
needs of transportation projects and will result in decreased vulnerability and 
increased safety and security. 
6.1.2 Agency Review Involvement 
 A critical factor to the success of this modified project development 
process lies in the willingness and ability for key agencies and personnel to 
participate in the process.  The basic requirement that projects be reviewed by 
qualified, competent staff that has access to the information they need to 
properly and accurately review projects is paramount.  This need exists in every 
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phase of the modified process.  The effectiveness of the modified process cannot 
be realized if we depend on other disciplines (i.e. safety, engineering) to 
determine applicability of security accommodations during the development 
process.  The modified process gives an efficient venue in which agencies can 
readily participate with minimal resource commitment.  The phased 
implementation process allows acclimation and adequate preparation during the 
move towards full utilization. 
6.1.3 Revision/Clarification Of Public Involvement 
 Security is a public issue.  It is impossible to properly consider security in 
the project development process without fully considering the impact of public 
participation in the process, especially when the process mandates public 
involvement.  The selection of the preferred project or the viability of project need 
can be controlled by public opinion alone, as long as a safety issue is not 
involved.  It is imperative that, during the modified project development process, 
we continue to involve the public and make the process as transparent as 
possible.  The modified process does not change the requirements for public 
involvement; it simply adds another focal point for practitioners.  The efforts to 
involve and educate the public of security consideration during project 
development must continue, especially when Floridians are struggling to 
understand all of the implications that security has on their daily lives.  These 
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efforts will manifest themselves in the project evaluation and selection process, in 
public workshops and hearings, and in other efforts to inform the public. 
6.2  Next Steps 
 This research effort can be applied immediately in order to consider 
security in Florida’s project development process.  As the topic of security and 
planning continue to develop at a rapid pace, so will the needs for continued 
efforts along this line of study.  These needs will include validation of the 
process, implementation efforts, future research needs, participation by local 
governments, and application of revised processes. 
6.2.1 Validation 
 There are three apparent methods to validate the revised process.  One 
method would include the use of a panel of experts to review the existing and 
modified processes and comment on its utility and effectiveness.  This panel 
could consist of FDOT PD&E personnel, representatives from the federal 
agencies involved in transportation planning and security (Appendix F), 
designated security personnel from the local and state governments, and 
recognized national security experts.  The panel would provide important 
feedback in order to further develop the process.  However, there will be a great 
reluctance on the part of local, state, and federal agencies to officially review and 
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comment on the procedure due to perceived endorsement and the liability 
associated with that perception.  During the course of this study, this 
phenomenon was experienced several times and would therefore be expected to 
occur during implementation.   
 Another method that could be used to validate the model would be to 
exhume completed projects, apply the revised process, and determine what 
changes would occur in the process and where those changes happened.  This 
would allow further development of the process and possibly determine certain 
threshold criteria for implementation of the process.  However, the only way in 
which this would work would be to have the additional federal security agencies 
(Table 5-1) participate in the process as if this were a new project.  The likelihood 
of this occurring, given the resource challenges of most federal agencies, would 
be remote.  Most of those agencies expend all of their resources interacting with 
current projects and could not afford to invest additional resources in past 
projects.  Participation would be minimal and would therefore not prove 
informational.   
 A final method would be the use of pilot projects along with a phased 
implementation plan.  This would allow governmental entities to participate in an 
official capacity, within the boundaries of their duties and responsibilities, and be 
expending resources on active projects.  This method would prove the most 
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realistic and proper way to advance this research effort to the next level of 
analysis. 
6.2.2 Implementation 
 Implementation of new policies and procedures occurs through pilot 
projects in Florida.  There have been several other initiatives, like ETDM and ITS, 
that have followed the same process and have been successfully implemented 
within the state.  It is expected that the revised project development process 
would follow this same path.  It is envisioned that a certain number of sample 
projects would begin to utilize the new process on an annual basis with the 
ultimate intent of widespread utilization in the next 3 to 5 years.  The mitigating 
factor of the revised process is that it does alleviate or relieve practitioners from 
fulfilling the requirements of the existing process.  This means that if a problem 
occurs on a pilot project, the existing system can be used to complete the project 
as normal.  
 Organizational change, especially in the public sector, can sometimes 
take long periods of time.  This research effort was undertaken with the intent of 
working within the existing organizational framework in order to reduce the 
amount of change that needed to occur.  This would allow greater acceptance of 
the revised processes and allow immediate implementation at some scale.  The 
revised process does not require any new committees to be formed, new 
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software to be developed, new infrastructure to be acquired, or any new 
employees to be hired.  The greatest amount of change that will be required will 
lie in changing the thought processes of those conducting the studies.  There will 
be additional efforts and energy expended for the increased coordination and 
communication, but no additional expertise is required for this to occur.  The 
changes to existing chapters of the PD&E Manual are minimal, with only form 
changes and additional procedure integration to occur.   
 Attention will have to be given to participation by the additional federal 
agencies.  As it stands, there would be little motivation for them to expend the 
additional efforts to review large numbers of projects above their normal 
workloads.  The phased implementation plan will help reduce the amount of 
additional review time and personnel needed at the onset of the program.  The 
FDOT should encourage the lead federal agency, typically the FHWA or FTA, to 
encourage participation by its sibling federal agencies.  This encouragement from 
other agencies and the implied liability associated with the reluctance to 
participate in such an important program should generate sufficient interest and 
response to the program.  It is also noted that many of the federal agencies could 
easily and quickly determine if they had any facilities involved with the proposed 
project through the use of the online ETDM screening tool.  ETDM would provide 
them with location information and they could quickly discount involvement of 
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certain agencies.  For example, the CBP could readily determine an assessment 
of no involvement if the project did not involve a national border. 
6.2.3 Future Research Needs 
 This research is the initial effort at incorporating security considerations 
into the project development process.  In order to fully develop and deploy 
security to our nation’s infrastructure, additional research must be done.  There 
must be additional research on the integration of technology into the process to 
allow detection, deterrence, and response.  The public involvement process must 
be reviewed for determination of adequate public education and involvement 
levels.  The interaction of land use with security and transportation networks 
must be explored.  Methods and costs of hardening existing and proposed 
infrastructure must be developed.  Funding priorities must be established and a 
funding implementation plan written.   A system of metrics should be developed 
in order to allow planners to accurately estimate costs and impacts associated 
with security considerations.  The legal ramifications of security concerns must 
be structured to include responsibility and liability.  
6.2.4 Local Participation 
 The revised process does not require a dramatic increase in resource 
needs from the local government agencies.  Since the revised process works 
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within the existing process, little new resources are required.  There are already 
several initiatives underway by local governments to inventory and assess critical 
infrastructure and security sensitive sites within their geographic area of 
responsibility.  However, in order to make the revised process efficient and 
effective, there is a minimum amount of data that would need to be collected.  
The minimum data to be collected would consist of location and descriptions of 
those facilities, both existing and planned, listed in Table 6-1.  This data should 
be collected and made available in some electronic format, preferably as a GIS 
layer. 
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Table 6-1 
Minimum Data Collection 
1. Bridges 
2. Tunnels 
3. Essential interchange structures 
4. Technological or other monitoring infrastructure 
5. Traffic management centers 
6. Telecommunications networks or hubs 
7. Utilities, such as power or natural gas 
8. Tourist attractions 
9. Public transportation networks and hubs 
10. Transportation networks 
11. National landmarks 
12. Industrial sites, such as chemical or nuclear plants 
13. Commercial traffic hubs, such as container ports 
14. Significant environmental protection areas 
15. Water supplies 
16. Banking and financial institutions 
17. Agricultural/Food producing facilities 
6.2.5 National Applicability Of Research 
 There are two elements of application that must to be addressed.  The first 
is that of spatial transferability and the second is that of application transferability.  
The Florida Project Development Process is sometimes used as a model of a 
complete and thorough satisfaction of the requirements of NEPA.  The nature of 
the PD&E manual is that of a framework for addressing the necessary elements 
of NEPA.  The PD&E Manual was developed as an agreement between the 
FHWA and the FDOT and reflects satisfaction of NEPA for roadway projects.  
The PD&E Manual does not present a detailed prescription of quantitative and 
qualitative factors.  Instead, it establishes the process and allows the user to 
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apply industry standards, standard practice, and local conditions to the 
formulation of reasonable and feasible alternatives and the selection of a 
preferred alternative.  Because of this, the process lends itself to easy 
transference to any other state in the nation.  All states must comply with NEPA 
and, because of the flexibility of the process in accommodating site specific 
conditions, this revised process can be employed effectively anywhere.  This 
flexibility also allows the process to be applied to different modes.  Even though 
the process in Florida is commonly used for roadway facilities, this method would 
prove effective for any mode of transportation.  It could even be used for private 
developments to include sites and facilities. 
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Appendix A:  Acronyms 
Table A-1 
List Of Acronyms 
AASHO American Association of State Highway Officials 
AASHTO American Association of State Highway and Transportation 
Officials 
AN Advance Notification 
APTA American Public Transportation Association 
ASCE American Society of Civil Engineers 
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers 
ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials 
ATA American Trucking Association 
BTS Bureau of Transportation Statistics 
CAAA Clean Air Act Amendment of 1990 
CATEX Categorical Exclusion 
CBP Customs and Border Protection 
CDR Corridor Development Report 
CE Categorical Exclusion 
CEI Construction Engineering & Inspection 
CEMO Central Environmental Management Office 
CEQ Council on Environmental Quality 
COA Class of Action 
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Table A-1 (Continued) 
List Of Acronyms 
Consultation 
 
Consultation means that one party confers with another 
identified party and, prior to taking action(s), considers that 
party's views. 
Cooperation 
 
Cooperation means that the parties involved in carrying out 
the planning, programming and management systems 
processes work together to achieve a common goal or 
objective. 
Coordination 
 
Coordination means the comparison of the transportation 
plans, programs, and schedules of one agency with related 
plans, programs and schedules of other agencies or entities 
with legal standing, and adjustment of plans, programs and 
schedules to achieve general consistency. 
CPDR Corridor Planning and Design Report 
CRAS Cultural Resource Assessment Survey 
CSER Contamination Screening Evaluation Report 
CTAA Community Transportation Association of America 
CTBSSP Commercial Truck and Bus Safety Synthesis Program 
CUTR Center for Urban Transportation Research 
DEIS Draft Environmental Impact Statement 
DEMO District Environmental Management Office 
DHS Department of Homeland Security 
EA Environmental Assessment 
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Table A-1 (Continued) 
List Of Acronyms 
EIS Environmental Impact Statement 
ESBA Endangered Species Biological Assessment 
EST Environmental Screening Tool 
ETAT Environmental Technical Advisory Team 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FCMP Florida’s Coastal Management Program 
FEIS Final Environmental Impact Statement 
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 
FHWA Federal Highway Administration 
FMCSA Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 
FRA Federal Railroad Administration 
FTA Federal Transit Administration 
FTP Florida Transportation Plan 
FY Fiscal Year 
GIS Geographic Information Systems 
HSIP Highway Safety Improvement Program 
ISTEA Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 
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Table A-1 (Continued) 
List Of Acronyms 
ITE Institute of Transportation Engineers 
ITS Intelligent Transportation System 
LBR Legislative Budget Request 
LHR Location Hydraulics Report 
MARAD Maritime Administration 
MIS  Major Investment Study 
MPO Metropolitan Planning Organization 
NCHRP National Cooperative Highway Research Program 
NEPA National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 
NHTSA National Highway Transit Research and Development 
Program 
NMSA Non-Major State Action 
NRCS Natural Resource Conservation Service 
NSA National Security Agency 
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board 
OFW Outstanding Florida Waterway 
OST Office of the Secretary 
PD&E Project Development & Environment 
PDO Program Development Office 
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Table A-1 (Continued) 
List Of Acronyms 
PER Preliminary Engineering Report 
PHMSA Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 
Plan Transportation Plan 
PPP Public-Private Partnerships 
Programmatic Type 1 Categorical Exclusion 
PSR Pond Siting Report 
RITA Research and Innovative Technology Administration 
SAE Society of Automotive Engineers 
SEIR State Environmental Impact Report 
SLSDC Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation 
STB Surface Transportation Board 
STIP Statewide Transportation Improvement Program 
STRAHNET Strategic Highway Network 
TCRP Transit Cooperative Research Program 
TEA-21 Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century 
TIP Transportation Improvement Program 
TRB Transportation Research Board 
TSA Transportation Security Administration 
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Table A-1 (Continued) 
List Of Acronyms 
TSI Transportation Safety Institute 
TSM Transportation System Management 
USDOT United States Department of Transportation 
USF University of South Florida 
VOLPE John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center 
WER Wetlands Evaluation Report 
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Appendix B:  List Of State Security Contacts 
Table B-1 
List Of State Security Contacts 
Alabama Transportation Planning Engineer 
Alabama Department Of 
Transportation 
Alaska Planning and Program Administrator 
Alaska Department of 
Transportation and Public 
Facilities 
Arizona Director Arizona Department Of Transportation 
Arkansas Director Arkansas State Highway and Transportation Department 
California Division Manager California Department Of Transportation 
Colorado Manager Colorado Department Of Transportation 
Connecticut Chief Connecticut Department Of Transportation 
Delaware Director Delaware Department Of Transportation 
District of 
Columbia Chief 
District of Columbia Department 
Of Transportation 
Florida Director Florida Department Of Transportation 
Florida District Planning Manager Florida Department Of Transportation 
Florida Director of Production Florida Department Of Transportation 
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Table B-1 (Continued) 
List Of State Security Contacts 
Florida District Planning Manager Florida Department Of Transportation 
Florida District Planning and Environmental Engineer 
Florida Department Of 
Transportation 
Florida Director of Planning and Public Transportation 
Florida Department Of 
Transportation 
Florida District Planning Manager Florida Department Of Transportation 
Florida 
District Planning, Public 
Transportation, and 
Environmental Management 
Manager 
Florida Department Of 
Transportation 
Florida District Planning Manager Florida Department Of Transportation 
Florida District Director of Operations 
Florida Department Of 
Transportation 
Florida District Director of Planning & Production 
Florida Department Of 
Transportation 
Florida District Public Transportation Manager 
Florida Department Of 
Transportation 
Florida District Public Transportation Manager 
Florida Department Of 
Transportation 
Florida District Public Transportation Manager 
Florida Department Of 
Transportation 
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Table B-1 (Continued) 
List Of State Security Contacts 
Florida District Director of Planning & Production 
Florida Department Of 
Transportation 
Florida District Director of Planning & Production 
Florida Department Of 
Transportation 
Florida District Modal Development Administrator 
Florida Department Of 
Transportation 
Florida District Planning and Public Transportation Manager 
Florida Department Of 
Transportation 
Florida District Planning and Public Transportation Manager 
Florida Department Of 
Transportation 
Florida District Director of Planning & Production 
Florida Department Of 
Transportation 
Florida District Public Transportation Manager 
Florida Department Of 
Transportation 
Florida District Director of Planning & Production 
Florida Department Of 
Transportation 
Florida District Director of Planning Florida Department Of Transportation 
Florida 
Assistant Secretary for 
Intermodal Systems 
Development 
Florida Department Of 
Transportation 
Florida Manager Florida Department Of Transportation 
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Table B-1 (Continued) 
List Of State Security Contacts 
Florida Project Development Engineer 
Florida Department Of 
Transportation 
Florida District Secretary Florida Department Of Transportation 
Florida Executive Director Florida Department Of Transportation 
Florida 
Manager, District 
Environmental Management 
Office 
Florida Department Of 
Transportation 
Florida District Project Development Engineer 
Florida Department Of 
Transportation 
Florida Modal Development Administrator 
Florida Department Of 
Transportation 
Florida Emergency Coordination Officer 
Florida Department Of 
Transportation 
Georgia State Transportation Planning Administrator 
Georgia Department Of 
Transportation 
Hawaii State Transportation Administrator 
Hawaii Department Of 
Transportation 
Idaho Public Involvement Coordinator 
Idaho Department Of 
Transportation 
Illinois Director Illinois Department Of Transportation 
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Table B-1 (Continued) 
List Of State Security Contacts 
Indiana Chief Indiana Department Of Transportation 
Iowa Director Iowa Department Of Transportation 
Kansas Director Kansas Department Of Transportation 
Kentucky Secretary Kentucky Transportation Cabinet 
Louisiana Assistant Secretary Louisiana Department Of Transportation and Development 
Maine Director Maine Department Of Transportation 
Maryland Director Maryland Department Of Transportation 
Massachusetts Director Massachusetts Department Of Transportation 
Michigan Director Michigan Department Of Transportation 
Minnesota Director Minnesota Department Of Transportation 
Mississippi Director Mississippi Department Of Transportation 
Missouri Transportation Program Manager 
Missouri Department Of 
Transportation 
 Appendix B (Continued) 
161 
 
Table B-1 (Continued) 
List Of State Security Contacts 
Montana Planning Administrator Montana Department Of Transportation 
Nebraska Division Manager Nebraska Department Of Roads 
Nevada Deputy Director Nevada Department Of Transportation 
New 
Hampshire Administrator Department Of Transportation 
New Jersey Assistant Commissioner New Jersey Department Of Transportation 
New Mexico Director New Mexico Highway and Transportation Department 
New York Director New York Department Of Transportation 
New York Director New York Department Of Transportation 
North Carolina Manager North Carolina Department Of Transportation 
North Dakota Director North Dakota Department Of Transportation 
Ohio Deputy Director Ohio Department Of Transportation 
Oklahoma Division Engineer Oklahoma Department Of Transportation 
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Table B-1 (Continued) 
List Of State Security Contacts 
Oregon Planning and Research Unit Manager 
Oregon Department Of 
Transportation 
Pennsylvania Planning Deputy Secretary Pennsylvania Department Of Transportation 
Pennsylvania Researcher Volpe Center 
Puerto Rico Director Puerto Rico Department Of Transportation 
Rhode Island Deputy Chief Engineer Rhode Island Department Of Transportation 
South Carolina Planning Engineer South Carolina Department Of Transportation 
South Dakota Planning and Programs Manager 
South Dakota Department Of 
Transportation 
Tennessee Chief Tennessee Department Of Transportation 
Texas Director Texas Department Of Transportation 
Utah Director Utah Department Of Transportation 
Vermont Director Vermont Department Of Transportation 
Virginia Chief Virginia Department Of Transportation 
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Table B-1 (Continued) 
List Of State Security Contacts 
Washington Transportation Planning Manager 
Washington Department Of 
Transportation 
Washington 
DC Director FHWA 
West Virginia Director West Virginia Department Of Transportation 
Wisconsin Director Wisconsin Department Of Transportation 
Wyoming Director Wyoming Department Of Transportation 
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Appendix D:  State Responses To Inquiry Letter 
Connecticut 
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Indiana 
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New York 
 
Oregon 
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Georgia 
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Florida 
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Appendix E:  Key Transportation Legislation 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
 In 1969 Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).  
The law was in response to increased concern for the natural environment.  This 
is the primary legislation that has shaped today’s Project Development & 
Environment (PD&E) process in Florida.  This Act satisfied the following goals: 
? Created the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) 
? Created basic requirements of Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) which 
must be prepared an all major Federal actions that significantly affect the 
environment. 
? Established a national environmental policy 
? Required federal agencies to use an interdisciplinary approach in planning 
and decision-making for any actions affecting the environment. 
? The creation of the CEQ was a major product of NEPA and has several 
primary functions which include: 
? Creation of environmental policy 
? Monitoring of environmental policy 
? Preparation of reports concerning status of environmental quality 
? Monitoring of all federal involvement in NEPA 
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 The NEPA process regiments the alternatives development and selection 
process by mandating that certain areas of analysis occur.  Compliance with 
NEPA is mandated when at least one of the following occurs: 
? Federal support will be required for any single phase of the project.  This 
support would most likely come in the form of funding. 
? There is the possibility that federal support may be needed for a project and 
there is a need to maintain the eligibility of the project. 
? Federal permits may be required.  An example may be a United States Coast 
Guard permit for a new bridge crossing over a navigable waterway. 
? Generally, federal approval of the project may be necessary. 
 Federal agencies can include the Federal Highway Administration 
(FHWA), the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA), and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA).  A 
significant amount of guidance has been developed concerning the intent of the 
NEPA process.  However the approach to implementation often varies 
substantially.  Many states have adopted umbrella policies or procedures under 
which they apply the NEPA process.  Federal agencies involved in the 
sponsorship of projects within these states have supported the guidelines for 
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each state and have developed a list of criteria that must be met for a project to 
be considered for federal funding.   
Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) 
 The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA) 
implemented broad changes in the way governments plan for all modes of 
surface transportation. The objective of ISTEA was to improve the performance 
of transportation systems by making transportation decisions with due 
consideration for social, economic, and environmental factors early in the 
planning process, coordinate planning efforts among affected agencies, and 
involve the public earlier in the decision-making process.  This legislation 
established many of the alternative evaluation criteria that are required in 
Florida’s PD&E process.  Security concerns alone are not a primary focus.  
ISTEA involved many aspects of the transportation process that had not been 
previously considered.  ISTEA considered the following: 
? System preservation, rather than new systems became a priority. 
? Acknowledged changing patterns in metropolitan areas in areas of 
development, economics, and cultural diversity and established stronger 
coordination and control for those areas. 
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? Dictated a more integrated planning process. 
? Increased emphasis on stakeholder participation in the process, especially 
the public. 
? Increased awareness of expansion constraints of the transportation network 
in highly urbanized or developing areas and the need for intermodal 
considerations. 
? Created a direct link between transportation improvements to the Clean Air 
Act Amendment of 1990 (CAAA) and state air quality plans.   
? Provided for a more flexible funding approach to transportation projects. 
Traditionally, there was little flexibility between funding sources for highway 
and transit projects.  The possibility of moving monies between these two 
areas greatly increased. 
? Required State Departments of Transportation (DOT) and Metropolitan 
Planning Organizations (MPO) develop cost feasible long-term and short-term 
transportation improvement plans based upon forecast revenues. 
Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century 
 On June 9, 1998, the President signed into law Public Law 105-178, the 
Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21) authorizing highway, 
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highway safety, transit and other surface transportation programs for the next 6 
years. Subsequent technical corrections in the TEA 21 Restoration Act have 
been incorporated; thus, the material presented here reflects the combined 
effects of both Acts and the two are jointly referred to as TEA-21. 
 TEA-21 builds on the initiatives established in the Intermodal Surface 
Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA), which was the last major 
authorizing legislation for surface transportation. This new Act combines the 
continuation and improvement of current programs with new initiatives to meet 
the challenges of improving safety as traffic continues to increase at record 
levels, protecting and enhancing communities and the natural environment as we 
provide transportation, and advancing America’s economic growth and 
competitiveness domestically and internationally through efficient and flexible 
transportation. 
 Significant features of TEA-21, that are reflected in Florida’s project 
programming and development processes, include: 
? Assurance of a guaranteed level of Federal funds for surface transportation 
through FY 2003. The annual floor for highway funding is keyed to receipts of 
the Highway Account of the Highway Trust Fund (HTF). Transit funding is 
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guaranteed at a selected fixed amount. All highway user taxes are extended 
at the same rates when the legislation was enacted.  
? Extension of the Disadvantaged Business Enterprises (DBE) program, 
providing a flexible national 10 percent goal for the participation of 
disadvantaged business enterprises, including small firms owned and 
controlled by women and minorities, in highway and transit contracting 
undertaken with Federal funding.  
? Strengthening of safety programs across the Department of Transportation 
(DOT). New incentive programs, with great potential for savings to life and 
property, are aimed at increasing the use of safety belts and promoting the 
enactment and enforcement of 0.08 percent blood alcohol concentration 
standards for drunk driving. These new incentive funds also offer added 
flexibility to States since the grants can be used for any Title 23 U.S.C. 
activity.  
? Continuation of the proven and effective program structure established for 
highways and transit under the landmark ISTEA legislation. Flexibility in the 
use of funds, emphasis on measures to improve the environment, focus on a 
strong planning process as the foundation of good transportation decisions—
all ISTEA hallmarks—are continued and enhanced by TEA-21. New programs 
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such as Border Infrastructure, Transportation Infrastructure Finance and 
Innovation, and Access to Jobs target special areas of national interest and 
concern.  
? Investing in research and its application to maximize the performance of the 
transportation system. Special emphasis is placed on deployment of 
Intelligent Transportation Systems to help improve operations and 
management of transportation systems and vehicle safety.  
? Maintained ISTEA program structure and decision-making processes; 
? Increased Federal funding levels and guaranteed annual funding; 
? Stressed simplification and streamlining of transportation decision-making 
processes; and 
? Established seven planning factors for consideration in Statewide and 
metropolitan planning processes. 
SAFETEA-LU 
 On August 10, 2005, the President signed into law (Public Law 109-59) 
the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act:  A Legacy for 
Users.  This federal transportation law provided funding for highway and transit 
improvement through the year 2009.  According to a brochure published by the 
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Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT September 2005), this new law 
provides the following: 
? Approximately $2 billion per year for transportation funding 
? Increased return on federal gas tax dollars 
? Protection of the Efficient Transportation Decision Making Process 
? Additional transit services 
? Increased funding on safety 
? It also modified some of the existing planning requirements for both 
Metropolitan and Statewide Planning (FDOT, August 17, 2005).   
 Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) are required to develop long-
range transportation plans (LRTP) and transportation improvement programs 
(TIPs).  The MPO process was changed as follows: 
? Provided additional funding sources for planning 
? Changed the existing 7 planning factors into 8 factors by separating safety 
and security into 2 distinct factors 
? Added requirements to the Long Range Plan for discussion of mitigation and 
consultation. 
 Appendix E (Continued) 
183 
 
? In Florida, changed the Long Range plan update cycle from every 3 years to 
every 5 years. 
? Modified the period for the TIP from 3 year coverage with a 2 year update 
cycle to 4 year coverage with a 4 year update cycle. 
? Extended the federal certification of Transportation Management Areas 
(TMAs) from 3 years to at not less than every 4 years. 
 The State of Florida is required to develop long-range statewide 
transportation plans and statewide transportation improvement programs (STIP).  
The statewide planning process was changed as follows: 
? Changed the existing 7 planning factors into 8 factors by separating safety 
and security into 2 distinct factors 
? Modified the Long Range Statewide Transportation Plan to require more 
consultation with State, tribal, and local agencies 
? Modified the period for the STIP from 3 year coverage with a 2 year update 
cycle to 4 year coverage with a 4 year update cycle. 
The 8 planning factors now include the following: 
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1. support the economic vitality of the metropolitan area, especially by 
enabling global competitiveness, productivity, and efficiency; 
2. increase the safety of the transportation system for motorized and 
nonmotorized users; 
3. increase the security of the transportation system for motorized and 
nonmotorized users; 
4. increase the accessibility and mobility of people and for freight; 
5. protect and enhance the environment, promote energy conservation, 
improve the quality of life, and promote consistency between 
transportation improvements and State and local planned growth and 
economic development patterns; 
6. enhance the integration and connectivity of the transportation system, 
across and between modes, for people and freight; 
7. promote efficient system management and operation; and 
8. Emphasize the preservation of the existing transportation system. 
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Appendix F:  Transportation Planning And Security Agencies 
United States Department of Transportation (USDOT) 
 The United States Department of Transportation was established by an 
act of Congress on October 15, 1966.  Their mission is to “Serve the United 
States by ensuring a fast, safe, efficient, accessible and convenient 
transportation system that meets our vital national interests and enhances the 
quality of life of the American people, today and into the future.” (USDOT 2006)  
The USDOT contains several organizations that include the Office of the 
Secretary (OST), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Federal Highway 
Administration (FHWA), the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 
(FMCSA), the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), the Federal Transit 
Administration (FTA), the Maritime Administration (MARAD), the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), the Pipeline & Hazardous 
Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), the Research and Innovative 
Technology Administration (RITA), The Saint Lawrence Seaway Development 
Corporation (SLSDC), and the Surface Transportation Board (STB). 
Office of the Secretary (OST) 
 The OST oversees the formulation of national transportation policy and 
promotes intermodal transportation.  Other duties include negotiation and 
implementation of international transportation agreements, assuring the fitness of 
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United States airlines, enforcing airline consumer protection regulations, 
issuance of regulations to prevent alcohol and illegal drug abuse in transportation 
systems and preparing transportation legislation. 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
 The FAA is responsible for the safety of all civil aviation in the United 
States.  Their mission statement is that “Our mission is to provide the safety, 
most efficient aerospace system in the world.”  Their vision is to “…improve the 
safety and efficiency of aviation, while being responsive to our customers and 
accountable to the public.” (FAA 2006)  The duties of the FAA include: 
? issuance and enforcement of regulations and standards relating to the 
manufacture, operation, certification, and maintenance of aircraft 
? certification and rating program for airmen and airports serving air carriers 
? oversees the program to protect the security of civil aviation 
? enforces regulations under the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act for air 
shipments 
? operates a network of air towers, air route and traffic control centers and flight 
service stations 
? develops air traffic rules 
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? allocates use of air space 
? provides for security control of air traffic to meet national defense 
requirements 
? construction/installation of electronic and visual aids to air navigation and 
safety 
? licenses commercial and private space launch facilities 
 In the aftermath of the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United 
States, primary responsibility for civil aviation security was transferred to the 
newly created Transportation Security Administration. 
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) 
 The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) is an agency of the United 
States Department of Transportation (USDOT).  The FHWA is tasked with the 
safety and technological status of the nation’s roadway network.  The FHWA 
typically provides funding to state and local agencies in support of the 
maintenance of the roadway network.  Their funding is directed towards two 
programs; (1) state and local governments and (2) the Federal Lands Highway 
funding for national parks and forests.  The Vision statement of the FHWA is 
“Improving Transportation for a Strong America.”  Their mission is “Enhancing 
 Appendix F (Continued) 
188 
 
Mobility through Innovation, Leadership, and Public Service.” (FHWA 2006)  
Their strategic goals include: 
? Safety 
? Mobility and Productivity 
? Global Connectivity 
? Environment 
? National Homeland Security 
? Organizational Excellence 
 They also state they have a few “Vital” priorities that include Safety, 
Congestion Mitigation, and Environmental Stewardship and Streamlining.  By 
these statements, it can be seen that the FHWA has a strong emphasis on safety 
and also somewhat of security.  The safety program is focused on reducing the 
42,000 traffic crash related deaths each year in the United States.  However, it is 
apparent that security concerns are not yet considered “Vital” in the nation’s 
primary, roadway focused, organization.   As security concerns continue to 
become more prevalent, it is expected that these concerns would mandate 
additional resources. 
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Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) 
 The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration was established as a part 
of the Department of Transportation by the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act 
of 1999 (Public Law No. 106-159, 113 Statute 1748, December 9, 1999).  The 
FMCSA historically was a part of the FHWA.  The FMCSA’s mission is to 
“…reduce crashes, injuries, and fatalities involving large trucks and buses.” It is 
based in Washington, D.C. and currently employs over 1,000 people.   
 The FMCSA’s strategy to carry out its mission involves: 
? Development and enforcement of regulations which balance motor carrier 
safety with efficiency. 
? Use of safety information systems to identify high risk carriers and to focus of 
enforcement of safety regulations. 
? Implementation of training and educational programs for carriers, drivers, and 
the public. 
? Partnership with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies and motor 
carrier specific groups. 
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 The key programs of the FMCSA are: 
? Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSRs) 
? Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMRs) 
? Commercial Driver’s License Program 
? Motor Carrier Safety Identification and Information Systems 
? Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program (MCSAP) 
? Performance & Registration Information Systems Management (PRISM) 
? Research and Technology (R&T) 
? Border and International Safety 
? Safety Education and Outreach 
? Household Good Program 
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) 
 The FRA was created by the Department of Transportation Act of 1966 
(49 USC 103, Section 3(e)(1)).  The FRA promotes safe and environmentally 
sound rail transportation.  It has the responsibility for railroad safety throughout 
the United States.  It employs safety inspectors to enforce federal safety 
standards which include track maintenance, inspection, and operation issues.  It 
also conducts research and development to evaluate projects for safety 
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compliance.  It also administers an education program for highway-rail grade 
crossing and trespassing on rail property. 
 The FRA operates through its seven offices.  These offices include 
Administration and Finance, Chief Counsel, Civil Rights, Policy, Public Affairs, 
Railroad Development, and Safety.  The Office of Safety promotes and regulates 
safety throughout the Nation’s railroad industry.  Its inspectors focus on 5 safety 
disciplines.  These safety disciplines include:  Track, Signal and Train Control, 
Motive Power and Equipment, Operating Practices, Hazardous Materials, and 
Highway-Rail Grade Crossing Safety. (FRA 2006) 
Federal Transit Administration (FTA) 
 The FTA assists in developing mass transportation systems for cities and 
communities.  FTA helps to plan, build, and operate transit systems, primarily 
through grant programs.  Their primary mission is to “Improve public 
transportation for America’s communities.” (FTA 2006) Their 3 core values are 
Excellence, Leadership, and Community.  They deal with all types of public 
transportation including buses, rail vehicles, ferryboats, trolleys, inclined railways, 
subways, and people movers.  The FTA has 4 strategic goals which include: 
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? Attract and retain the best people 
? Deliver products and services that are valued by FTA customers 
? Establish effective business processes and leverage technology 
? Position public transportation as the mode of choice in America 
They also have 4 Core Accountabilities which include: 
? Transit Ridership Growth 
? Safety and Security Readiness 
? Major Project Cost Control 
? Grant Processing Efficiency 
Maritime Administration (MARAD) 
 The MARAD serves to promote development and maintenance of an 
adequate, well-balanced, United States merchant marine that is sufficient to carry 
the United States’ domestic waterborne commerce and a substantial portion of it 
waterborne foreign commerce.  It also has the capability to serve as a naval and 
military auxiliary in time of war or a national emergency.  MARAD also ensures 
that the Nation has adequate shipbuilding and repair service, efficient ports, 
effective intermodal water and land transportation systems, and reserve capacity. 
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 The mission of MARAD is  
“To strengthen the U.S. maritime transportation system - including 
infrastructure, industry and labor - to meet the economic and 
security needs of the Nation. MARAD programs promote the 
development and maintenance of an adequate, well-balanced 
United States merchant marine, sufficient to carry the Nation’s 
domestic waterborne commerce and a substantial portion of its 
waterborne foreign commerce, and capable of service as a naval 
and military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency. MARAD 
also seeks to ensure that the United States maintains adequate 
shipbuilding and repair services, efficient ports, effective intermodal 
water and land transportation systems, and reserve shipping 
capacity for use in time of national emergency.” (MARAD 2006) 
 Its goals include commercial mobility, national security, the environment, 
organizational excellence, and vision.  Their national security goal focuses on 
assuring an intermodal sealift capacity to support vital national security interests. 
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National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) 
 The NHTSA is responsible for reducing deaths, injuries and economic 
losses resulting from motor vehicle crashes.  They determine and enforce safety 
performance standards for motor vehicles and equipment.  The NHTSA 
responsibilities include: 
? investigation of safety defects 
? establishment and enforcement of fuel economy standards 
? assistance to states and communities to reduce the threat from drunk drivers 
? promotion of the use of safety belts, child safety seats and air bags 
? investigation of odometer fraud 
? establishment and enforcement of vehicle anti-theft regulates 
? Consumer information on motor vehicle safety. 
 Their mission statement is to “Save lives, prevent injuries and reduce 
economic costs due to road traffic crashes, through education, research, safety 
standards and enforcement activity.” (NHTSA 2006) They are dedicated to 
achieving the highest standards of safety through its core values of Integrity, 
Service, and Leadership. 
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Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) 
 The PHMSA was created through the Norman Y. Mineta Research and 
Special Programs Improvement Act (Public Law 108-426) on November 30th, 
2004. The PHMSA oversees the safety of more than 800,000 daily shipments of 
hazardous materials in the Nation and about 64 percent of the Nation’s energy 
transported by pipelines.  They are tasked to eliminate transportation related 
deaths and injuries related to hazardous materials and pipeline transportation.  
They also promote programs that enhance communities and protect the natural 
environment.  Their emphasis is on safety.  Their safety focus is defined as 
follows: 
? Hazardous Materials Safety Risk Management 
? Hazardous Materials Safety International Standards 
? Pipeline Compliance and Safety 
? Pipeline Damage Prevention 
? Pipeline Safety Research and Development 
 The PHMSA focuses on 2 programs, hazardous materials and pipeline 
safety.  They have an active education and training program to educate industry, 
transportation system operators, and governments.  They use cooperation with 
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industry, academia, professional associations and government to facilitate the 
education and training programs.   Another key role is that of regulation.  The 
PHMSA’s Office of Hazardous Materials Safety develops regulatory standards for 
classifying, handling and packaging of daily shipment of hazardous materials 
within the United States.  The Office of Pipeline Safety ensures safety in the 
design, construction, operation and maintenance, and spill response to 2.3 
million miles of pipelines. 
Research and Innovative Technology Administration (RITA) 
 RITA as formed under the Norman Y. Mineta Research and Special 
Programs Improvement Act (Public Law 108-426, 2004).  Their mission is 
centered on the desire to advance DOT priorities for innovation and research in 
transportation technologies and concepts.  These concepts would improve 
mobility, promote economic growth, and deliver a better integrated transportation 
network.  They focus on collaboration, information sharing, coordination, support, 
and advocacy.  RITA includes the Volpe National Transportation Systems 
Center.  The Volpe Center is dedicating to enhancing the effectiveness, 
efficiency, and responsiveness of other Federal organizations with critical 
transportation functions and mission.  RITA also includes the Bureau of 
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Transportation Statistics and the Transportation Safety Institute and the 
University Transportation Centers program, such as the Center for Urban 
Transportation Research (CUTR) located at the University of South Florida 
(USF). 
John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center 
 The Volpe Center is a center for transportation and logistics expertise.  
The Center helps decision makers solve transportation related problems through 
research and development, engineering, and analysis.  Their work includes 
projects that involve multiple modes and disciplines.  Their vision is “To be a 
world-recognized Center of excellence, a leader for innovation and a forum for 
government, industry, and academic cooperation in the development and 
improvement of transportation and logistics systems.” (Volpe 2006) Their mission 
is “To anticipate future national, state, local and international transportation and 
logistic issues and requirements, to develop tools and technologies addressing 
them for our clients, and to be a catalyst for innovation in transportation 
technologies and management processes to make the transportation system 
safer and more effective and efficient.” (Volpe 2006) 
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Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) 
 The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) of 1991 
established BTS for data collection, analysis, and reporting and to ensure the 
most cost-effective use of transportation monitoring resources.  The mission of 
BTS is “…to lead in developing transportation data and information of high 
quality, and to advance their effective use in both public and private 
transportation decision making.”  Their vision is that their “Data and information 
of high quality will support every significant transportation policy decision, thus 
advancing the quality of life and economic well being of all American.” (BTS 
2006) The strategic goals of the BTS include Relevance, Quality, Timeliness, 
Comparability, Completeness, and Utility. 
Transportation Safety Institute (TSI) 
 The TSI was established in 1971 to assist the DOT accomplish their 
training needs.  The TSI develops and conducts worldwide safety, security, and 
environmental training, products, and services for both public and private sectors.  
The training offered by TSI includes transit, aviation, pipeline, motor carrier, 
highway safety, hazardous material, and risk management.  The divisions of the 
TSI include Aviation Safety Division, The Coast Guard Inspection Training & 
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Assistance Team, The Hazardous Materials Division, The Highway Safety 
Division, The Pipeline Safety Division, the Special Programs Division, and the 
Transit Safety & Security Division. 
Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation (SLSDC) 
 The SLSDC was created on May 13, 1954.  The SLSDC operates and 
maintains a safe, reliable and efficient waterway for commercial and non 
commercial vessels between the Great Lakes and the Atlantic Ocean.  The 
SLSDC works in conjunction with the Saint Lawrence Seaway Authority of 
Canada to oversee operations safety, vessel inspections, traffic control, and 
navigation aids on the Great Lakes and the Saint Lawrence Seaway. 
Surface Transportation Board (STB) 
 The STB was created by the Interstate Commerce Commission 
Termination Act (ICCTA) of 1995 (Public Law 104-88).  The STB is an economic 
regulatory agency responsible for: 
? resolving railroad rate and service issues 
? rail restructuring transactions to include mergers, line sales, construction, and 
line abandonment 
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? certain trucking company, moving van, and non-contiguous ocean shipping 
company rate matters 
? certain intercity passenger bus company structure, financial, and operational 
matters 
? rates and services of certain pipelines not regulated by the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission 
 The STB is divided into the Office of Compliance and Enforcement, the 
Office of Congressional and Public Services, the Office of Economics, 
Environmental Analysis and Administration, the Office of Proceedings, and the 
Office of General Counsel. 
Transportation Research Board (TRB) 
 The TRB is a unit of the National Research Council (NRC).  The NRC is 
charged to serve as an independent advisor to the federal government and 
others on scientific and technical questions of national importance.  The mission 
of the TRB “is to promote innovation and progress in transportation through 
research.” (TRB 2006)    The TRB acts as an information clearinghouse of 
transportation practice and policy, stimulates research and offers research 
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management services that promote technical excellence, and provides “expert” 
advisory services. 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
 The DHS was formed as part of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
(Public Law 107-296).  The DHS provides the main mass for the variety of 
national organizations and institutions involved in national security efforts.  Their 
mission is “We will lead the unified national effort to secure America.  We will 
prevent and deter terrorist attacks and protect against and respond to threats and 
hazards to the nation. We will ensure safe and secure borders, welcome lawful 
immigrants and visitors, and promote the free-flow of commerce.”   (DHS 2006) 
Their strategic goals include Awareness, Prevention, Protection, Response, 
Recovery, Service, and Organizational Excellence.  Three agencies comprise the 
DHS.  These include the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Customs 
and Border Protection (CBP), and the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA). 
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Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
 The TSA was created in direct response to the terrorist attacks on 
September 11, 2001 as part of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act 
(Public Law 107-71) that was enacted on November 19, 2001.  The mission of 
the TSA is to protect the nation’s transportation network through ensuring 
movement of people and goods.  The TSA is also responsible for security at the 
nation’s airports.  It strives to set the standard in transportation security. 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 
 The CBP is a part of the DHS.  Their mission is to protect our borders 
against terrorism. 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
 FEMA was formally organized on July 20, 1979 by President Jimmy Carter 
(Executive Order 12148).  FEMA’s mission is “to lead the effort to prepare the 
nation for all hazards and effectively manage federal response and recovery 
efforts following any national incident. FEMA also initiates proactive mitigation 
activities, trains first responders, and manages the National Flood Insurance 
Program and the U.S. Fire Administration.” (FEMA 2006) 
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Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) 
 The CEQ was established within the Executive Office of the President by 
Congress as a part of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and 
supplemental responsibilities were added by the Environmental Quality 
Improvement Act of 1970.  The CEQ coordinates federal environmental efforts 
and works closely with agencies and other White House offices in the 
development of environmental policies and initiatives.  The CEQ reports to the 
President of the United States annually on the state of the environment, oversees 
federal agency implementation of the environmental impact assessment process, 
and acts as a referee when other agencies disagree over the adequacy of 
assessments. 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 
 The NTSB was created on April 1, 1967.  The NTSB is a federal agency 
that is responsible for investigating and recommending corrective actions for 
every civil aviation accident in the United States and for “significant” accidents for 
other modes.  In addition, the NTSB conducts special studies of safety issues of 
“national significance.”  The NTSB does not regulate transportation equipment, 
personnel, or operations nor does it handle enforcement.  Their 
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recommendations have achieved an 82 percent adoption rate with over 12,000 
recommendations being adopted. 
Private Organizations 
 There are a large number of private organizations involved in the 
transportation planning process.  The key players are the American Public 
Transportation Association (APTA), the American Association of State Highway 
and Transportation Officials (AASHTO), and the Institute of Transportation 
Engineers (ITE) and their general roles in transportation planning are discussed 
in the following sections. 
American Public Transportation Association (APTA) 
 The APTA is a private organization that focuses on advocacy in 
Washington, coordination of meetings and conferences, training and education, 
industry information clearinghouse services, data collection and dissemination, 
and an awards and recognition provider for the Public Transportation Industry.  
Their mission statement is “To strengthen and improve public transportation, 
APTA serves and leads its diverse membership through advocacy, innovation, 
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and information sharing.”  (APTA 2006) They currently have 6 strategic goals 
which include: 
? Ridership 
? Economic Vitality 
? Advocacy 
? Image 
? People and Organizations 
? Safety and Security 
? Association Development 
 Their fifth goal, Safety and Security, has 5 desired outcomes.  These 
include: 
? Enhanced public confidence in the safety and security of public transportation 
? Programs to encourage safer and more secure public transportation systems 
? Sustained development and implementation of industry standards 
? Programs and services on standards and effective safety practices for public 
transportation systems. 
? Full engagement of the public transportation industry in shaping government 
safety and security policies and programs 
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 Their strategies for accomplishing these outcomes include: 
? Maintain regular communication with members regarding APTA and industry 
safety and security resources and initiatives. 
? Continue the exchange of effective safety and security practices through 
committees, conferences, and workshops. 
? Educate governmental security agencies and facilitate partnerships with them 
to foster responsiveness to industry and user needs. 
? Continue to develop operational and cost-effective industry standards that 
promote safety and security. 
? Assess APTA’s safety audit program and identify opportunities for 
improvement. 
? Continue to promote the vital role of public transportation in local and regional 
emergency preparedness. 
? Identify, promote, and encourage the use of industry best practices for safety 
and security initiatives developed in partnership with governmental 
organizations. 
? Facilitate partnerships to develop and implement innovative responses to 
transit security threats. 
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The American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials 
(AASHTO) 
 The American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials 
(AASHTO) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization representing highway and 
transportation departments in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto 
Rico.  Their mission is to advocate transportation policies and provide technical 
services to support agencies to efficiently and safely move people and goods. 
Institute of Transportation Engineers (ITE) 
 The ITE was founded in 1930 as a private multimodal professional 
international organization.  Its membership is comprised of professional who are 
responsible for meeting society’s needs for safe and efficient surface 
transportation through planning efforts, system design, system implementation, 
and operation and maintenance of networks. 
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